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PREFACE
This study was conducted to provide new knowledge and information pertinent to
the u.s. wheat and wheat flour industry in order to expand U.S. wheat and flour exports.
The markets underlying the growth in wheat and wheat flour import demand have shifted
away from traditional markets of the early 1980s (the former Soviet Union (FSU), the
European Union (ElI), and China). Currently, import demand growth is occurring in
Afiica, Asia (outside of China), and the Middle East. Specific objectives of this research
were: Paper I--(a) to determine the supply factors affecting the markets shares of the
U.S. and other export competitors in each import market; (b) to determine the demand
characteristics of specific import markets and analyze how these factors affect the
importers buying decisions; and Paper II--(c) estimate accurate demand elasticities of
selected import markets; and d) analyze and compare elasticities of government assisted
importers with cash importers.
I sincerely thank my thesis advisor and committee members--Drs. Shida and David
Henneberry and Dr. Daniel Tilley-- for guidance, support, and patience in the completion
of this research. I also would like to thank Nouhoun Coulibaly, Junxiang Lu, Kullapapruk
Piewthongngam, Genelle Harper, LeAnne Palmer, and the Great Plains Agricultural Policy
Center for their support and assistance.
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PAPER I
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
OF U.S. AND COMPETITOR
WHEAT MARKET SHARES
IN SELECTED IMPORTING COUNTRIES
Introduction
World wheat and products trade is dominated by five major exporters: the United
States (U.S.), the European Union (EU), Canada, Australia, and Argentina. Together,
these exporters provide up to 90 percent of the wheat supply available for export
(U.S.Department of Agriculture, 1995-97). For the past 20 years, the United States has
been the leading exporter ofwheat and wheat products to all international markets.
However, the four U.S. competitors have been gaining market share over the past 20
year". and are forecast to export record levels in 1996/97 with 1997/98 projections at near-
•
record levels. Strong world prices have been the incentives for a heavily subsidized
domestic market in the EU and increased amounts of land area devoted to wheat
production in Australia, Argentina, and Canada.
Wheat is one of the main commodities traded to meet the consumption needs of
countries allover the world. Wheat is the food staple that supplies the basic survival
needs ofmore than 100 countries around the globe (Halliburton and Henneberry). Over
50 percent of the wheat produced in the United States is exported for international
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consumption (USDA, 1995-97). Also, the US. population accounts for less tban 5
percent of the world's potential wheat consumers, so the majority ofwheat consumers are
beyond the domestic border of the United States (USDA, 1995-97).
The combination of tight world wheat stocks and an increase in regional import
demand over the past twenty years has intensified global wheat trade competition. Import
demand from regional markets, in particular Asia, Africa, and the Middle East has been
growing quite steadily for the past 20 years. Rapid population growth and movements to
more wheat-based diets have been the driving forces behind the import surge since the
1970s. Import demand in these regions continues to remain strong and is highly
influenced by unstable domestic production and reduced government involvement in
importing activities.
The record levels ofwheat produced by the European Union, Canada, Australia,
and Argentina in the last several years have had a significant impact on the United States'
presence in global wheat trade. Increased production levels by U.S. competitors are
drivir.J world wheat exports to record high levels. The US. accounts for only 28 percent
of total wheat, flour, and products trade; the second lowest level in 10 years. This is a
considerable reduction from 47 percent in the mid-1970s. This loss of U S. market share
has been captured by the EU, Canada, Australia, and Argentina. Together, these exporters
have increased their market share and account for 65 percent ofglobal wheat and products
trade (USDA, 1995-97). Therefore, the primary objective ofthis study is to examine the
overall position of the U.S. wheat industry in the international market, by analyzing the
market share of the U.S. and primary export competitors. This study is intended to
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improve the understanding ofthe supply, demand, and quality-related factors affecting the
ability ofthe exporters to gain international market share. This study will determine the
current situation facing the wheat exporting countries by examining the market
characteristics of a group of selected importing countries. More specifical1y~ the classes of
wheat demanded, the types of import purchases and available credit, and the advantages
the exporters have in each market will be examined for the studied importing countries.
The following importing countries have been selected for this analysis: Japan, Egypt,
South Korea, Philippines, Algeria, and Jordan. It was the intent of the authors to provide
a complete analysis differentiating wheat and wheat flour, however the main portion of
this study will be directed towards only wheat including wheat, wheat flour, and products
due to data restrictions. In addition, data reported by the Foreign Agricultural Service,
USDA is a combination ofwheat, wheat flour, and wheat products.
Competitive Pricing Among Exporters
In order to understand the position of the U.S. wheat industry in the international
mark.:.!:, it is imperative to understand the term competitive. In previous literature, a
competitive exporter has been defined as a consistent supplier of any good or service that
exports these goods before any and all suppliers (Rose, 1997). With this definition in
mind, the U.S. is already at an export disadvantage because of its reputation as a residual
supplier. The U.S. has always been the highest priced supplier in the international wheat
market. Wheat importing countries have been known to purchase the high-quality, lower
priced wheat from U. S. competitors (i.e. EU, Canada, and Australia), and then purchase
the remaining consumption needs from the U.S. Economic theory suggests that price and
3
quality are the two main factors which determine the importer's decision to purchase
wheat. Furthennore, demand theory explains that quantity demanded is a function of
prices and income with the world market prices determined by supply and demand factors
within a given market. Therefore, the price and quality ofD.S. wheat available to
international markets is the determining factor in whether the US. can be the "first,
consistant" supplier of wheat to the import market. Government intervention has played a
major role in the pricing systems in the ED, Australia, and Canada. Because of different
agricultural policies and pricing mechanisms, these exporters competing with the US. for
international market share have been able to offer competitive prices that are considerably
lower than U.S. prices. This gives these countries the ability to offer high quality wheat at
a lower price than the US., therefore these competing exporters are able to gain the
competitive advantage over the US. Also, the different policy structures within the
respective wheat industries directly and indirectly influence movements in the world wheat
market and the changes and patterns of prices that are offered to the international buyer by
each r mpeting supplier. More detailed information regarding each exporting countries'
•
agricultural policies is discussed later in this study.
Competitive Trade of Bulk, Intermediate and Value-Added Products
The competition between bulk, intermediate and value-added products has been
increasing at a rapid rate across all international markets. Rising incomes and changes in
consumer tastes and preferences are boosting the sale ofvalue-added foods. While some
may view that the future ofUS. agricultural trade is dependent upon exports ofhigWy-
processed, value-added products; the demand for basic food staples such as wheat and
4
other grains remains strong. Excluding the traditional high-profiled markets of China, the
European Union (formerly the European Community), and the Former Soviet Union
(FSU), wheat import demand from much of the rest of the world has been growing
steadily since the early 1970s (see Figure 1) (USDA, 1995-97). As economic
development spreads throughout the world, and many countries experience income and
population growth, there will remain a strong demand for food. A study conducted by the
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), projects world population to be 9.8 Billion by
the year 2050. This is a growth ofover 73 percent over a period of approximately one
hundred years. Developing countries are also expected to grow at a rate of 80 million
people annually, doubling their populations by 2050 (USDA, 1995-97). These economies
will continue to rely on staple food supplies to meet the nutritional needs of their rapidly
growing populations. Therefore, commodities, such as wheat and wheat products, will
continue to be essential to the future growth ofagricultural trade. In 1995, bulk
commodities accounted for approximately 50 percent (see Figure 2) of the value of total
U.S. 2.o ricultural exports. Also in 1995, wheat alone accounted for 21 percent of the
value of total bulk commodities earning $5.4 billion (USDA, 1995-97).
Import Demand
World wheat trade reached record high levels in the mid-1980s with a few
countries underpinning import demand growth. During this time, the former Soviet
Union (FSU), Eastern Europe, and China, were the focal import markets for the U.S. and
its competitors. However, wheat import demand has since then declined in all three
regions. Economic and political events in each of these traditional importing countries
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resulted in a decline in the respective wheat import programs.
Political reform and massive liquidation oflivestock in the former Soviet Union
dramatically reduced wheat demand for feed in the 1980s. After the move to a democratic
government, less wheat was being imported for feed use and the demand for food use was
met by trade from within the respective regions.
China became a major wheat importer when the country's exploding population
increased wheat demand to record levels in the 1980s. However, the recent increase in
domestic production has satisfied the growing demand and China's wheat import program
was reduced.
Prior to the early 1970s, the European Union was also a large importer ofwheat
and wheat products. However, in 1962 the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the EU
was introduced to support agricultural producers (USDA, 1996b). A fixed producer price
incentive was the main tool under this policy to increase domestic wheat production in
order for Europe to ensure food security (Gardner). This economic policy created a large
surplu' ofwheat and the EU pursued a highly subsidized export program. By the late
1970s, the European Commission concentrated on increasing exports to deplete surplus
wheat stocks. This moved the ED from a traditional wheat importer to a net wheat
exporter (USDA, 1995-97).
While import demand from these traditional markets fell, the demand in much of
the rest of the world began to rise. Regional demand from Asia, Africa, the Middle East
has grown over 70 percent over the past twenty years and now account for nearly three-
quarters ofglobal wheat imports (USDA, 1995-97).
6
Export Competition
The rivalry among exporters to gain market share in the international wheat market
has intensified over the past twenty years with the growth in import demand from several
regional markets. As import demand moved away from the high-profiled importers,
including China, the European Union, the former Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe, the
major exporters changed their export focus to satisfy the growing demand in Africa, Asia
(outside of China), and the Middle East (USDA, 1995-97). In this section, we will
examine the export competitors' market shares in each of the selected importing countries.
The analysis will show which exporter has the advantage in each of the importing markets,
and the competitive trends of each exporter over time. Examining the exporters' focus is
essential in understanding the competition in each market and the situation facing the US.
wheat industry. It is the intent of the authors to show with measureable market share data
which exporters are competitive in each importing countries and the trend of export
competition over time. This market share analysis is not intended to imply that a high
marke~ hare is or needs to be the goal of the wheat industry and/or wheat traders in the
U.S. It is possible for an exporter to have a low market share in a market and increase the
quantity or volume of wheat exported to that market. The market share data represent the
percentage ofU S. dollar value of exports to these selected importing countries. This
market share data was used in order for the reader to easily make the percentage
comparison between the competitive exporters in each import market.
Although Argentina is the fifth largest exporter of wheat in the world, this exporter
will not be included in this analysis because Argentina is not a major supplier of wheat to
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these targeted importing countries. Argentina exports up to 80 percent ofits wheat
supply to South America, which is not included in this study.
Tables 1, 2, and 3 show the market shares of each competitor in regional markets
during the time period 1983-1994. These countries were chosen for this study to
represent the regional markets underlying the growth in wheat import demand. The time
period was chosen to show an accurate time-series trend of the competition in each
market. The market share data are from the USDA, Foreign Agricultural Service United
Nations Calendar Year data system.
The market share data clearly show that with the exception of a few years in
Algeria and Egypt, the US. was the leading exporter of wheat (over 50 percent market
share) in all countries. While the U.S. clearly dominated wheat trade in Jordan, Egypt,
and the Philippines, a decline in U.S. market share occurred in South Korea. Although
u.s. market share in Japan rallied in 1994 after slight fluctuations throughout the time
period, U.S. market share in South Korea plummeted. Canada's gain in market share in
South Trorea is the most notable increase of all the competitors in any of these importing
countries. As U.S. market share dropped from 99 percent to only 34 percent, Canada's
share of the market increased from not even competing in this market to exporting 42
percent of all wheat supplied to South Korea. In the Philippine market, the US. has
remained the leading wheat exporter. Movements in the U.S. market share in the
Philippines have been moderate, however the U. S. no longer holds 100 percent market
once held in the early 1980s. Despite any movement in US. market share in these
countries, the competitors all have gained market share in respective countries. In the
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Asian markets, Australia benefits from the small US. loss in the Philippines, while Canada
captures the "lions share" in South Korea. All three competitors (U.S., EU, Canada)
maintain market share in Algeria, while the US. and Australia alternate as top supplier in
Egypt. The US. remains the dominate supplier ofwheat in Jordan, and the US., Canada,
and Australia experience only slight market share changes in Japan.
Although the U.S. is losing market share in a few individual markets, the situation
facing the US. wheat industry is not severe. However, Canada, Australia, and the EU are
increasing their efforts to gain a competitive advantage in nearby markets.
The EU advantage in the Afiican and Middle Eastern regions is due primarily to
the proximity between these nearby markets. The EU is able to supply one large shipment
ofwheat for a price that is more competitive than the other exporters. Lower
transportation and freight costs will reduce the overall cost of the wheat to the importer.
Also, Africa is the primary recipient of food aid from the EU and relies heavily on this aid
for imports offlour (USDA, 1995-97).
:\ustralia and Canada are gaining an export advantage because ofrecent increases
in wheat production and stock levels. Both countries have a very steady domestic
consumption rate and are very dependent upon the international market for depleting
wheat supplies. Approximately 70 percent of Canada and Australia's wheat supply is
consumed by international markets (USDA, 1995-97). Also, large supplies ofwheat
available for the international markets will depress world market prices, making it more
economical for international markets to import wheat. In the 1980s, Canada and Australia
were large suppliers ofwheat to the traditional importing markets (former Soviet Union,
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Eastern Europe, the EU, and China). The reduced import demand from these regions has
directed Canadian and Australian exports to Asia and the Middle East. Both Australia
and Canada are developing new quality and marketing tools to gain market share (USDA,
1995-97).
Supply Factors AtTecting Export Competition
Production
In order to meet the growing demand for wheat around the world, the United
States and its competitors must be able to produce adequate supplies ofhigh-quality,
affordable wheat. Wheat production also determines the amount of wheat available for
export as the exporters vie for market share. The United States is one of the largest wheat
producers in the world, averaging approximately 63 million metric tons each year (USDA,
1995-97). The production of wheat is very important to the agricultural sector in the
United States.
Table 4 outlines the supply and distribution of U.S. wheat over the past five years.
Relati Iy higher world wheat prices have encouraged the increase in land area devoted to
wheat in the U.S. Despite the continuation of favorable wheat prices, production levels
are forecast to decline in the future due to an increase in the area devoted to alternative
crops. Producers are making this movement to higher-priced alternative crops because of
the 1996 Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act (FAIR). Producers now have
the option of planting alternative crops on traditionally allocated wheat acreage.
Producers will now be able to make planting decisions based on the price of the open
market instead of relying on traditional commodity payments implemented by the
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government. Increased competition from other domestic crops, especially feed grains, and
lower wheat prices willlikeJy reduce the land area devoted to wheat production and
production levels in coming years (USDA, 1997). Despite, an expected decline in winter
wheat production., the Economic Research Service predicts lower wheat prices for the
future (USDA, 1997). The pressure for lower wheat prices is attributed to slightly larger
expected wheat supplies in the U. S. and other major competitors. AJso, the decline in
winter wheat production is expected because of higher world prices for alternative feed
grains. If higher prices on alternative crops remain, pressure will be added to produce
these higher priced commodities on traditionally wheat based acreage (USDA, 1997).
Canada, Australia, the European Union (EU), and Argentina have all experienced
an increase in wheat production over the last several years. Together, these competitors
combined, produced approximately 25 percent of total world wheat production over the
last five years (USDA, 1995-97). The increase in production levels in these five countries
accounts for 70 percent (approximately 31.5 million metric tons) of the total increase in
world ,. oduction (USDA, 1995-97). Higher world prices and favorable weather
conditions throughout much of the world have contributed to a very unusual time period
of increased production levels in the European Union, Australia, Argentina and Canada.
Wheat Varieties and Uses
Several different varieties are grown in almost all fifty states throughout the U.S.
because of the different climates, soils, and topography. These factors detennine planting
decisions across the different geographical areas (USDA, 1995-97). Each variety of
wheat is considered its own class and is determined by its color and hardness of the seed,
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and time of planting. There are six different classes ofU.S. wheat and each is also
characterized by the milling, baking, or consumption use. The six different classes of
wheat are Hard Red Winter (HRW), Hard Red Spring (HRS), Hard White (HW), Soft
White (SW), Soft Red Winter (SRW), and Durum. Table 5 gives a detailed description of
each type ofwheat, the consumption purpose, and area of the U.S. each variety is grown.
Each of the competitors produce classes of wheat comparable to U.S. varieties. The
consumption uses are also similar to the U.S. The hard wheat varieties (red winter and
spring) are used for bread, milling and baking, and noodles. The soft wheat varieties are
used for flat breads, pastries, cookies, crackers and snack foods. Finally, Durum is used
for pastas such as spaghetti and macaroni noodles. These consumption characteristics are
another factor affecting the competitiveness of each exporter. The United States is the
largest producer ofHard Red Winter wheat and is competitive in the import markets that
rely on this particular variety for consumption needs. The EU, Australia, and Canada have
the competitive advantage in the countries that consume the white wheat varieties. The
ED is ! ne of the largest producers of Soft White wheat, and Canada and Australia are
developing new varieties ofHard White wheat. Egypt and Algeria are the largest white
wheat consumers and depend on this variety for the milling of bread. The ED, Australia,
and Canada have an advantage in these two markets.
Agricultural Policies of Major Exporting Countries
Government AssistedExporters
Under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the European Union, the
European Commission highly regulates the internal supply-demand structure of the ED.
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In order to manage internal pricing and domestic supply, the Commission offers a price
incentive for wheat producers. The price incentive was introduced under CAP as a fixed
control measure. However, the Commission continually changes the incentive due to
variable internal prices and intervention stock levels. The price incentive was first
introduced by the Commission in the late 1970s (USDA, 1996b). Also under CAP is a
mandatory land set-aside program. The land set-aside program is mandatory for
producers to receive the direct producer payment. This set-aside program consists of
fanners removing arable cropland from production (USDA, 1996b). The mandatory rate
was established under CAP, however with continually changing market conditions, the
Commission often changes the set-aside rate as a measure to control the domestic market
(USDA, 1995-97). A reduction in the set-aside rate would likely encourage larger wheat
plantings and raise stock levels. An increase in the set-aside rate would likely reduce
wheat plantings and stock levels and result in a tighter wheat supplies for the domestic
market (USDA, 1995-97).
•.The supply of wheat in Canada and Australia is controlled by their single desk-
selling wheat boards. These boards market the wheat collectively using the open market
U.S. price only as a reference. Because of this monopolistic management style, all supply
and demand information of both countries is kept confidential to their respective
industries. However, both boards, the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) and the Australian
Wheat Board (AWB), purchase all wheat destined for international markets. The demand
from international markets and the level of government stocks directly affect the farmers'
production decisions. In times of weak demand from international markets, and high
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levels ofgovernment stocks, wh,eat not purchased by the boards is either sold for domestic
use or held as privately-owned, on-farm stocks at the cost ofthe producer. Wheat
producers in these countries must only speculate the amount ofwheat the boards will
purchase when making production decisions (U.S.General Accounting Office, 1992).
Free Market Exporters
Argentina is the smallest of the five major exporters in wheat production, stock
levels, and exports. Higher world prices, increases in the use of agricultural inputs, and
improved technology have attributed to the rise in the level ofwheat production. With the
exception ofmacroeconomic policies to encourage investment, economic planning, and a
more efficient use of resources, the Argentine government has a very limited role in the
wheat industry, In recent years, the Government has moved away from any involvement
in agricultural policy and marketing decisions to further encourage market developement.
In addition, the view ofthe Argentine government is that the production and export
subsidies, implemented by the European Union and the United States have had a negative
impac'.--on agricultural wheat trade. Therefore, there are no major policies, programs, or
subsidies that would encourage supply decisions made by the producers. Less government
intervention has lead to a reduction in input costs and more efficient means of
transportation, communication and marketing and port services. The factors that have
lead to an increase in Argentine wheat production are an increase in inputs, such as
fertilizers, herbicides and fungicides, and fann machinery, and improved cultivation
practices. The use of agricultural chemicals has more than doubled in the last few years.
No-till cropping and strip or contour plowing have also become relatively common to
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maintain soil moisture and prevent wind and water erosion. The increase in Argentina's
wheat production is expected to continue in coming years due to improvements in yield.
The amount of arable land under cultivation in Argentina is relatively fixed, however any
increase in the area devoted to wheat and other grain products will likely depend upon
prices of the livestock industries, namely beef and poultry (USDA, 1995-97).
For many years there have been significant changes in each of these policy
structures that have impacted the world wheat market and the competition among
exporters. The World Trade Organization (WTO) replaced the General Agreement of
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to continue the progress towards an environment offreer trade
and less government involvement. In the attempt to reduce and remove trade barriers in
the international market, the WTO has prompted changes in subsidy trading practices in
the ED and the U.S. ED wheat subsidies have been significantly reduced, while U.S.
subsidies have been eliminated. The discriminatory trading and pricing regimes in Canada
and Australia (i.e. single desk-selling commodity boards) will be discussed in the 1999
rourw ofthe WTO. Although the main objective of this study focuses on the current
situation in each of the exporting countries, it is imperative to review the historical events
ofeach of these stuctures and recognize how these changes have influenced the
international wheat market. Table 6 gives a brief history ofU.S. and competitor export
policies.
Export Programs
Export tools and marketing and technical servicing programs (i.e. subsidy, credit
guarantee and food aid programs, and foreign direct investment) implemented by the U. S.,
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-EU, Canada, and Australia are expected to impact the market shares. Changes and
increases in these programs have historically pressured world wheat prices and
strengthened the competitiveness among exporters. Historically, the EU and the U.S.
have both used export subsidies to maintain and increase market shares in the importing
countries. The EU continues to supplement wheat exports with subsidies and taxes
depending on domestic market conditions, while the u.s. suspended the Export
Enhancement Program (EEP) in July of 1995. While Canada and Australia strongly
oppose of the use of export subsidies in the wheat export market, both wheat industries
use monopolizing, single desk-selling wheat boards to collect and market wheat for
export. Argentina is the only competitor that exports wheat on the cash market without
additional export or policy tools. These different export programs have been used to
increase or maintain market shares in specific countries, and have resulted in an intense
competitive export environment.
Government Subsidies
. The principal exporting tool for the ED wheat industry is its export restitution
(subsidy) program. These subsidies are a function of the internal supply-demand balance
regulated under the Common Agricultural Program (CAP) (Gardner). In order to protect
the domestic supply ofwheat and domestic consumption, the European Commission
intervenes with producer incentives to control all price levels within the internal market.
Export restitutions are issued for the excess wheat supply resulting from the direct
producer payments (Gardner). The Commission uses two different procedures to award
restitutions for the export of wheat. Restitutions are offered each week and the
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procedures differ depending on whether the wheat is from intervention stocks or the open
market ( Bourgen and Le Roux). Both types ofawards are determined by weekly bids
issued by European traders. Intervention refunds are tendered for by lots. Each trader
submits a per metric ton bid based on the necessity to export wheat on the international
market at a competitive price. The Commission retains the highest bid for each lot and
then detennines a floor price level corresponding to the traders' bids and the export
quantity objectives set by the Commission. All bids above this floor-level price are
accepted and the restitutions are awarded for export (Bourgeon and Le Roux).
For open market exports, the Commission buys an export service from the traders
who accumulate stocks from within the internal market. The traders submit an
anonymous bid to the Commission specifying the export quantity and the desired refund.
The refund is requested based on the cost to the trader of supplying the wheat. The
Commission ranks the bids in increasing order and then determines a target refund and the
corresponding quantity. Any and all bids equal to or less than this target refund have
qual'led for an export contract. The qualified recipients of the refund receive the amount
requested, not the target refund, if the obligation to export is awarded by the Commission
(Bourgeon and Le Roux). Not all bids to export are fulfilled, and the Commission has the
authority to refuse any and all tender for export at any time. In recent years, the ED has
also implemented an export tax to discourage exports when high internal prices occur due
to tight domestic supplies (USDA, 1989).
To counteract the price-cutting subsidies of the EU and to maintain market share,
the U.S. established the Export Enhancement Program (EEP) in July of 1985. This
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subsidy program enables U.S. exporters to export U.S. wheat at prices below the
exporter's cost of acquiring the good and to under-cut restitutions and other price-cutting
mechanisms offered by U.S. competitors. EEP is administered by the Foreign Agricultural
Service, USDA. All EEP wheat sales are made by the private exporter, not the U.S.
government. USDA reviews the requested subsidy bids and compares the amounts with
other U.S. bids and competing country wheat sales (USDA, 1996c). Before the subsidy is
approved by USDA, the exporter must have the terms of the sale (price, quantity, quality,
delivery, etc.) negotiated with the prospective buyer. The sale may be contingent upon the
approval of the subsidy (USDA, 1996c). Once a requested subsidy is accepted, the
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) and the exporter enter a contract agreement. This
agreement specifies the exact amount of the subsidy, how it is calculated, and the
exporter's responsibility to make the sale. Once actual proof of the sale is obtained, the
exporter can then request the actual cash bonus. from the CCC (USDA, 1996c).
The combination oru.s. and EU subsidy programs enables U.S. and EU traders to
offer wheat at prices below the world price. This also dampens world prices, making it
difficult for Canada, Australia, and Argentina to offer competitive prices to foreign buyers
that successfully covers domestic costs of production and transportation.
Marketing Programs
Both the Canadian and Australian Wheat Boards (CWB and AWB) have
implemented marketing efforts to direct their export focus on particular markets. The
CWB and AWB have taken steps to increase their presence in the Asian market. New
"designer wheats" have been developed to satisfy Asian demand for the production and
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milling of noodles (USDA, 1995-97). Both Canada and Australia have also established
joint venture flour mills and long-term purchase agreements in several importing countries
throughout Asia. Canada has also implemented technical training programs to educate
Asian consumers on the best end-uses for Canadian wheat (USDA, 1995-97).
The government ofArgentina (GOA) has recently launched a campaign to
challenge wheat producers to improve marketing techniques and quality scales. The GOA
is developing a new high quality wheat standard. The new grade is known as "trigo plata"
and will have maximum moisture content of 13 percent. In addition, the Government is
proposing an improvement in the classification system. Argentina's current system of
classification consists of only three quality levels. The improved system of grades will
differentiate milling properties, protein levels and specific weights to improve the quality
and image of Argentine wheat in international markets. These quality marketing programs
will allow Argentina to become more competitive in world markets (USDA, 1995-97).
Commercial Export Programs
Commercial credit guarantee programs are a very important part of the decision to
import wheat from any origin supplier. The United States, the European Union, Canada,
and Australia offer credit programs for wheat import purchases to the selected countries
for this study. The United States and the European Union are the two main suppliers of
extensive credit guarantee programs. Australia and Canada both offer very short-term
credit lines, however detailed information about these programs and specific participating
countries is not available from the respective commodity marketing boards. The U.S. and
the EU gain more of an advantage with these guarantee programs because oflarger credit
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-lines and longer repayment. terms for the purchasing countries.
The United States issues two credit programs to importing countries through the
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC), United States Department ofAgriculture for
commercial financing ofU.S. agricultural exports. The General Sales Manager 102 and
103 programs (GSM-I02/GSM-I03) cover credit terms for up to three and ten years
respectively. The CCC does not directly provide financing through the GSM-I02 and 103
programs, but simply guarantees payments due from approved foreign banks. The
guarantee provided by the CCC covers up to 98 percent of principal and a portion of the
interest at an adjustable rate. This helps U.S. financial institutions to offer competitive
credit terms for importing countries (USDA, 1996e).
Of the fifteen member countries ofthe EU, France is the only member country that
offers a competitive credit line to importing countries. The French Coface line of credit is
the major competing program ofthe U.S. credit guarantee programs. Similar to aU of the
EU exports, the French Coface line of credit focuses on the African region.
• " Canada's Credit Grain Sales Program requires repayment in full within 36 months
or less from the time of shipment. Credit sales made outside of this program are eligible
to be rescheduled for repayment outside of the original maturity dates for periods of 5 to
25 years (Canadian Wheat Board). These extended loans are limited to only a few distinct
countries and the countries are chosen after a very thorough credit and liability
assessment.
The Australian Wheat Board offers credit sales through the Export Finance and
Insurance Corporation (EFIC). There are two types of coverage under the EFIC: normal
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and national interest. Under normal coverage, the AWB pays premiums to EFIC and the
EFIC provides credit guarantee for up to 80 percent of the sale based on the individual
countries risk assessment. The repayment terms are normally for one year. However,
under the National Interest coverage, EFIC may refer more risky transactions, or sales that
would otherwise be commercially unsound to the Trade Minister for consideration. If
these sales are approved, the EFIC enters into the transactions and may take a share of the
risk involved. Costs and losses of these credit sales are born by the government
(Australian Wheat Board).
Due to the sensitivity of the credit terms and assessments, the U.S. government is
the only competitor with historical and available information regarding the selected
importing countries participation in the U. S. credit guarantee programs. The credit lines
of the U.S. programs are allocated each fiscal year (October-September); therefore, it is
difficult to compare the credit lines to the total trade marketing year imports, which are
measured on a July-June year by the Foreign Agricultural Service, United States
Depal: ment ofAgriculture. However, examining the importance of credit buying to each
individual importer and the impact these programs have on the amount ofwheat
purchased is essential to this study.
A large portion of the United States' GSM-102/l03 programs is used for wheat
and flour exports. During the first half of the 1990s, an average of 20 percent of the total
value of the 102 program was used for wheat and wheat flour. Although the 103 program
is much smaller in value, wheat alone has received up to 78 percent of the total program
value. Approximately 28 and 13 percent of the total quantity of wheat exported under the
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U.S. GSM-I02 and 103 programs respectively is targeted to Egypt, Algeria, Jordan,
Philippines, and South Korea. Table 7 provides the actual amount ofwheat, in thousand
metric tons, imported under the United States General Sales Manager program during
Fiscal Years 1990/91 and 1994/95 by each selected country. The total market imports,
including cash, concessional, and commercial purchases are also included in this table,
however comparisons can not be made between the two figures because of the type of
year the data is reported. Credit program units are reported in Fiscal Year (October-
September), while the total market imports are reported on a Trade Year (July-June).
Over the last five years, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan and South Korea have participated
in the U.S. credit guarantee programs. GSM imports by these participating countries,
excluding Egypt, have steadily declined since the early 1990s. Declining program imports
are result of higher world prices and lower program allocations by the U.S. government
(USDA, 1996e). Although Algeria has been the largest importer under these programs,
imports under 102 have declined most rapidly. South Korean imports have also declined
consilil rably. Egypt is the only country in this study that has actually seen an increase in
imports under these programs. Jordan's GSM imports have been very minimal and
sporadic (USDA, 1996d).
Conces~onaIEx,portPrograms
In addition, the U.S. is the major supplier of wheat under concessional programs.
Public Law-480 (pL480) is the U.S. government concessional sales program and is also
administered by the Foreign Agricultural Service, USDA. Of the total 4.8 million metric
tons of concessional wheat shipped in 1994, 2.2 million metric tons was supplied by the
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U.S. Purchases made under D.S. PIASa are either food aid donations for humanitarian
food needs, government to government sales under 30 year credit for developing
countries, and/or government to goverrunent grants to least developed countries for
economic development. Over the last ten years, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and the
Philippines have received concessional wheat imports from the U.S., ED, and Canada.
The PIASa program has targeted all four of these countries, while the EU and Canada
sales have been to the African region (USDA, 1995a).
Table 8 is a summary of the export programs offered by each exporter.
Demand Factors of Selected Import Markets
The six individual importing countries chosen for this study have different
consumption and import patterns. These patterns are imperative to understand the
demand for wheat from the United States and its competitors as these countries' wheat,
flour, and product imports together account for approximately 50 percent ofU.S. total
group exports. The following information regarding each country was gathered from
annual eports prepared by the agricultural attaches of the Foreign Agricultural Service,
USDA, 1996. Table 9 describes each individual importer's buying characteristics by type
of purchase and exporter tool and Table 10 summarizes import demand characteristics of
each import market.
Egypt imports an average of 6 million metric tons ofwheat each year and has one
of the highest consumption rates of all wheat consumers, averaging approximately 180
kilos per capita per year. Over 70 percent ofEgypt's wheat consumption needs will be
supplied primarily by the United States, Australia, and the European Union. Soft White
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Wheat is the variety preferred by Egypt for the milling of one ofthe most frequently
consumed types ofbread--ba/adi, which is supplied by the United States or Australia.
Soft and hard red winter varieties are also imported from the United States or the
European Union, and used'for pasta and the milling of french style breads. The
Government ofEgypt (GOE) has embarked on a program to increase domestic wheat
production. The goal is to attain 70 percent self-sufficiency within the next few years. In
order to achieve this goal the GOE implements the following tariffs and fees to all
imported wheat: 5 percent customs duty based on eIF value, 10 percent sales tax, 1
percent commercial and industrial profit tax, 1 percent service charge, 3 percent
discharging and transportation fees, and 2 percent to open the line ofcredit.
Algeria is the world's largest food grain consumer and is on average a 4 million
metric ton wheat import market. Approximately 72 percent ofthe total food supply is
composed of domestic and imported wheat. Over 65 percent of the Algeria's population
is under 20 years old, so it is extremely important to maintain an ample supply of food.
Algeri' .s young society has boosted the growth of per capita wheat consumption
dramatically in the last twenty years. Per capita wheat consumption in the 1970 was 80 kg
compared to the present rate of 230 kg. The majority of imported wheat is used for
domestic consumption plus, there is a very low demand for wheat for feed use. Less than
3 percent ofall imported wheat is used for feeding purposes.
Jordan imports an average of slightly less than 700 thousand metric tons and
consumes approximately 500-600 thousand tons ofwheat each year. The majority of this
consumption consists ofHard Red Winter with small amounts of Soft Red Winter and
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-Hard Red Spring. The major suppliers ofwheat to Jordan are the United States, the
European Union and Australia. The majority ofwheat entering Jordan is under credit
guarantee programs and food aid provided by these three suppliers.
South Korea's wheat imports average roughly 4 million metric tons per year.
South Korea's domestic production is very minimal, so almost 100 percent of the wheat
used is imported. The Korean demand for wheat is equally divided between food use and
feed use, however each seCtor is driven by different factors. Wheat used for consumption
(noodleslconfectionary items/bread) is driven by mainly quality and milling characteristics,
whereas the feed wheat market is driven by price. Per capita consumption of wheat for
1995/96 was 34.5 kg, which is a substantial increase from the .9 kg from the previous
year. Soft Red Winter, Hard Red Winter, and Spring Wheat are the main varieties
imported from the U.S., Canada, Australia, and the European Union. Canada and
Australia are providing the strongest competition by targeting wheat quality specific to
Asian diet preferences. Australian Standard White is preferred by South Korea because of
its hig! starch content and shorter cooking time for Korean noodles. Tariff rates for
imported wheat have been reduced in the Uruguay Round of the World Trade
Organization. The applied rate of3 percent will be reduced to 1.8 percent by 2004. This
equates a tariff rate of2.64 percent in 1997.
Per capita consumption ofwheat in the Philippines has increased steadily over the
last 15 years. This increase is a result of an annual population growth of 2 percent and a
strong economic growth period beginning in 1994. Per capita wheat consumption is now
26 kilos per year. The United States, Canada, and Australia are the primary suppliers of
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wheat to the Philippines. The U.S. remains the top supplier ofDark Northern Spring and
Soft White to the Philippine market for several reasons. These varieties have a higher
protein content and are easier to mill than wheat from other competitors. In addition, the
Philippines are accustomed to wheat from the U.S., and the U.S. is capable of combining
Dark Northern Spring with the Soft Western White variety in any shipment.
Japan is a very mature wheat import market, yet remains one of the largest
markets for the United States and its competitors. Japan purchases approximately 6
million metric tons each year from the United States, Canada, and Australia, and is
accustomed to purchasing roughly the same amount of wheat from each supplier each
year. Japan is strictly a cash buyer and fluctuations in purchases from each supplier is
determined by price. Japan's per capita consumption rate has been a steady 32 kg per year
for the last 10 years. The Food Agency of Japan's Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and
Fisheries controls all imported wheat as well as both producer and resale prices ofwheat.
Imported wheat is purchased by the Food Agency and then sold to consumers at prices
that arl,;'"sometimes two and three times higher than the purchase price. The Food Agency
allows flour millers to import wheat outside of the Agency, however they must export the
equivalent amount. This "free wheat" as it is called is imported at world price and is
extremely profitable for the millers. Japan is essentially a cash buyer and imports Hard
Red Winter, Hard Red Spring, White Wheat, and Durnm.
Concluding Remarks and Implications
Concern over the future of U.S. wheat trade has been growing over the past
several years. Wheat producers and traders and wheat policy makers have been striving to
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increase U.S. market share to the record levels once attained in the mid-1980s. However,
the traditional markets that were once the driving force behind the record levels ofwheat
trade, are now self-sufficient and are satisfying wheat demand with domestic supplies.
However, the attention of the major exporters is now directed to three growing markets
underpinning the growth in wheat trade: Africa, Asia (outside ofChina) and the Middle
East. Despite the overall decline in U.S. wheat trade, U.S. market shares in individual
markets within these regions have remained fairly stable.
The elimination of the U.S. subsidy program and the reduction of ED restitutions
has had a positive affect on the world wheat markets. World market prices have
experienced an upward trend and the world wheat market has been able to adjust more
freely to supply and demand factors as intervention from U.S. and the ED has weakened.
However, the U.S. position in the international wheat market is still being threatened by
the presence of price-cutting subsidies and single-desk selling wheat boards in the
international wheat market. These intervening price mechanisms will continue to distort
the int national trade environment and will keep world market prices stalled at low levels.
Furthermore, the U.S. will likely remain the highest priced wheat supplier and will lose
market share in these importing markets. Elimination of all government intervention in all
competing suppliers would allow the world market to move freely to supply and demand
signals and would likely create fair competitive conditions in the international market.
Although credit guarantees provided by the exporters (mainly the U.S.) have been
reduced, these programs continue to playa very important role in the decision of the
foreign countries to import. Japan is the only "cash buyer" that depends on the world
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market price to make import purchases. In addition, South Korea is phasing out their
participation in government assisted import programs, however the remaining target
countries have relied and will likely continue to rely on commercial and/or concessional
programs for wheat imports.
Recent increases in area devoted to wheat acreage among the competitors has
driven wheat production to record levels. This combined with the intent to increase
domestic stock levels, has further intensified the competition among the exporters.
Argentina, Canada, Australia and the ED are beginning to focus on nearby markets with
improvements in quality standards and varieties, infrastructure, and marketing techniques
and services that will satisfY the demand in targeted countries and capture a larger share of
the market. Although an in depth analysis of Argentina's export focus was not included in
this study, Argentina continues to focus on South America. As Argentina continues to
develop a wheat quality system and improve domestic infrastructure, future Argentine
wheat exports will likely compete with the "big four" in these growing markets.
• "It is evident from this analysis that in order to gain an export advantage, price,
quality, and export credit programs are necessary to successfully compete in the
international wheat market. Although the U.S. market share has not surpassed the record
levels once achieved in earlier decades, the U.S. remains the leading force in international
wheat trade.
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•Figure 1: Wheat and Wheat Product Import
Demand, Selected Countries, 1972-2010
(proj ections).
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Figure 2: Total US Exports of Bulk,
Intermediate, and Consumer Ready Goods,
Calendar Year 1995.
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Table 1. Total Market Imports (in thousand Metric Tons) and Export Competition Market Shares (in Percentages) in
Selected African Countries, Calendar Years 1983 -1994.
"•.
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Algeria
Total Market 2,129 2,006 3,030 2,623 1,849 2,826 4,580 2,612 2,322 2,329 2,588Imports a
US l 30.4% 20.8% 30.8% 71.7% 61.6% 51.8% 37.7% 32.5% 43.3% 44.2% 43.8% a
EU2 33.1% 34.7% 33.4% 9.1% 7.3% 15.5% 41.9% 41.5% 28.1% 36.7% 25.5% a
CN3 30.1% 39.2% 32.9% 18.8% 30.8% 270% 18.1% 24.7% 275% 189% 30.0% a
w
N Egypt
Tota! Market 2,577 2,721 2,337 3,405 3,633 3,576 3,069 4,456 4,116 4,964 2,340Imports a
US l 48.2% 259% 25.6% 34.4% 45.2% 46.2% 66.7% 28.3% 42.% 67.9% 46.7% a
EU2 18.1% 8.3% .1% ---- 7.9% 9.2% 7.9% 20.3% 6.4% 2.4% 13.1% a
CN3 94.0% 17.5% 15.3% 6.4% 8.1% 2.7% .7% ---- .7% 1.3% ---- a
AUS4 ---- 24.5% ---- 5.9% ---- 41.9% 23.4% 47.3% 44.4% 28.4% 38.1% a
Source: Based on data from FAS, USDA United Nations Calendar Year data system, 1983-1994
a 1994 data are not available
1 United States; 2 European Union; 3 Canada; 4 Australia
1Table 2. Total Market Imports (in thousand Metric Tons) and Export Competition Market Shares (in Percentages) in Middle
Eastern Countries, Calendar Years 1983 -1994.
-.
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Jordan
Total Market 319 451 377 271 542 400 172 611 759 553 667 508Imports
US' 56.4% 55.1% 56.7% 55.2% 54.1% 13.4% 92.9% 95.4% 55.8% 41.4% 96.4% 97.3%
EU2 ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .25% ---- .5% 4.4% .1% 3.6% .16%
CN3 27.5% 28.2% 25.6% 28.6% 28.9% ---- ---- 1.2% ---- ---- ---- 2.5%
W AUS4 16.1% 16.7% 17.7% 16.2% 16.9%w
Source: Based on data from FAS, USDA United Nations Calendar Year data system, 1983-1994.
I United States; 2 European Union; 3 Canada; 4 Australia
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Table 3. Total Market Imports (in thousand Metric Tons) and Export Competition Market Shares (in Percentages) in
Selected Asian Countries, Calendar Years 1983 -1994.
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Philippines
Total Market 797 766 663 960 672 1,017 2,480 1,889 935 2,652 2,199 2,147Imports
US1 100% 100% 98.8% 92.8% 76.6% 98.5% 83.80% 72.3% 91.5% 77.4% 85.7% 92.5%
EU2 ---- ---- ---- ---- 2.5% ---- .04%
CN3 ---- ---- 1.2% 1.4% 20.6% 1.4% 16.03% 27.5% 8.0% 13.9% 4.1% .95%
AUS4 ---- ---- ---- 5.8% .2% .1% .09% .2% .4% .1% 7.8% 6.53%
South Korea
Total Market 1,854 2,648 2,984 3,449 4,121 4,116 2,275 2,516 4,790 3,546 4,939 6,057Imports
US1 99.1% 74.4% 71.2% 62.3% 55.3% 57.7% 80.3% 72.9% 427% 50.5% 369% 34.51%
w EU2 ---- 1.78% .07% 2.82% 4.5% ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 3.42%~
CN3 ---- .64% 1.4% 14.5% 27.4% 1.5% 1.7% 8.1% 20.6% 16.5% 37.8% 42.43%
AUS4 ---- 21.4% 27.1% 17.5% 9.7% 3.9% 9.7% 13.7% 23.3% 16.1% 232% 18%
Japan
Total Market 5,816 5,978 5,510 5,620 5,476 5,724 5,578 5,474 5,693 5,979 5,814 6,352Imports
US1 56.4% 55.1% 56.7% 55.2% 541% 54.8% 52.8% 53.3% 55.3% 55.5% 53.5% 57.8%
CN3 27.5% 28.2% 55.6% 28.6% 28.9% 28.6% 29.1% 28.6% 26.8% 27.8% 27.1% 24.1%
AUS4 16.2% 16.7% 17.7% 16.2% 16.9% 16.4% 18.1% 18.1% 17.9% 16.7% 19.4% 18.1%
Source: Based on data from FAS, USDA United Nations Calendar Year data system, 1983-1994
I United States; 2 European Union; 3 Canada; 4 Australia
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rTable 4. U.S. Wheat: Supply and Distribution, Thousand Metric TonslHectares, Trade Yea~ 1993/94 - 1997/98
fI>
.
Area Yield Production Imports Exports Domestic EndingHarvested Trade Yr. Trade Yr. Total Use Stocks
1993/94 25,379 2.6 65,220 3,161 33,084 33,738 15,472
1994/95 24,998 2.5 63,167 2,390 32,208 35,014 13,787
1995/96 24,664 2.4 59,400 1,748 33,594 31,024 10,234
1996/97 25,435 2.4 62,099 2,450 26,500 35,312 12,663
1997/98 24,685 2.5 61,547 2,500 27,500 34,291 15,152
~ Source: Based on data from FAS, USDA
aWheat trade statistics are on July /June years.
~
Table 5: United States Wheat Varieties, CQnsumptiQn Characteristics, and Area Grown
Source: Based on data from FAS, USDA.
Variety
Hard Red Winter
Hard Red Spring
Hard White
Soft White
Soft Red Winter
Durum
•
DescriptiQn
accounts for 40 % ofU.S. wheat crop and exports;
used for milling and bread making~ 11-12% prQteing
cQntent; grown in the Great Plain states from the Mississippi
River to the RQcky Mtn. States and Texas
accounts for 20% ofU.S. wheat exports; used for bread,
milling, baking; highest prQtein content of all wheat: 13-14%;
grown in N. Central US. (Dakotas, MinnesQta, Montana)
newest class ofwheat grQwn in the U.S.~ used for yeast breads,
noodles, flat breads; used primarily in domestic markets, however
expected to have the largest increase in exports in the future;
grown in CalifQrnia, Idaho, Kansas, and Montana
accounts for 20% ofUS. wheat exports; low protein
content: 10%; preferred for flat breads, cakes, pasteries,
crackers, and noodles; grown in the Pacific Northwest
accounts for 14% ofUS. wheat exports; high yielding wheat;
IQW in protein: 10%; used fQr cakes, pastries, flat breads,
crackers, and snack foods; grown in the eastern one-third
(1/3) of the U.S.
accounts for only 5% of U.S. wheat exports~ hardes of all
varieties; used for spaghetti, macaroni, and other pastas;
small quantities grown in Arizona and CalifQrnia, most is grown
in N. Central U.S. (Dakotas, Minnesota, MQntana)
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Table 6. History of US. and Competitor Export PolicyPrograms
United States Australian Wheat Board Canadian Wheat Board ED Common Agricultural Policy
1985:
-Established Export
~ Enhancement Program
(EEP) to:
-di~pose of excess wheat
supplies on the international
market
-maintain U.S. wheat
market share
-counteract competitor
price-cutting subsidies
Established in 1~39 to
acquire and market wheat
for sale to the domestic and
international markets
1948:
-AUS government
established stabilization fund
to guarantee unit pool
returns to growers; set
domestic consumer prices in
line with guaranteed price
(only on a specified limit)
-Enforced export tax when
export price>guaranteed
price and deficiency
payment when export
price<guaranteed price
Established in 1935 by the
Canadian Wheat Board Act
giving the CWE control of
acquiring and marketing
wheat for domestic and
international markets
1935:
Canadian Government covers
all CWE wheat pool deficits
1983:
-Western Grain
Transportation Act
established Canadian rail and
freight transportation
subsidies;
-Elimination of direct
payment compensation
Established in 1962 to:
-increase agricultural productivity
-ensure a fair standard of living; to
stabilize markets
-to guarantee a steady food supply
at reasonable prices to consumers
1967:
-uniform prices were established for
cereal grains to protect domestic
market:
Target price: optimum price
producer should receive
Intervention price: market floor
price the Commission pays for
purchasing intervention products;
used to boost market prices
Threshold price: minimum price for
non-EU imports
i
rTable 6. History of U.S. and Competitor Export Policy Programs (continued)
w
00
United States
1995:
-Elimination of Export
Enhancement Program
(EEP)
Australian Wheat Board
II.
1989:
-AUS government guarantees
AWB borrowings (up to 85%
of expected net returns) to
pay wheat producers initial
payments
-Stabilization fund was
eliminated
-Domestic market was
deregulated (AWB no longer
had sole authority; must
compete with other domestic
sellers)
-Wheat Industry Fund was
established as a nonsales
source of revenue for the
board; wheat growers must
pay 2% levy that underwrites
domestic trading and serves as
a capital base
Canadian Wheat Board
1995:
-Elimination of rail and freight
transportation subsidies;
Farmers received direct
payments to compensate for the
loss of the subsidy
1996:
-Canadian government provides
crop insurance, research, and
income support to producers
EU Common Agricultural Policy
-Variable levy: tax on imports to
ensure imports do not undercut
target prices of domestic
commodities
-Export subsidies: when world
market prices are below EU
market price cash bonus are paid
to exporters to enable surplus
commodities to be exported
competitively to the international
market
-Export levy: when world prices
are above EU market prices a tax
is imposed to exporters to prevent
disposing ofEU products
-direct producer payments: amount
paid to fanners to increase wheat
production
~.
Table 6. History of U.S. and Competitor Export Policy Programs (continued)
W
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United States
The United States
currently relies on the
world market price to sell
all wheat for export
Australian Wheat Board
~
-AWB does not pay tax on
commodity sales
AWB is currently the single
seller ofwheat in Australia and
has authority over all Australian
wheat destined for export.
Thus, it has a sure source of
supply and can use economies
of scale to disperce the cost of
operations.
Canadian Wheat Board
-CWB pays no taxes to the
federal government
CWB currently is the single seller
ofwheat for export in Canada and
has the authority over all Candian
wheat destined for exports.
EU Common Agricultural Policy
- mandatory set-aside rate: specific
amount of arable cropland that
must be removed from production;
set at 17% under CAP
1992 CAP Reform:
-support prices reduced by 33%
-reduced prices are compensated
for by direct producer payments
1997:
-mandatory set-aside rate
reduced to 5%
The EU currently issues export
restitutions (subsidies) to export
excess wheat supplies in order to
regulate and control the domestic
market
Sources: Based on data from U.S. General Accounting Office (USGAO) and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA).
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1Table 7. Imports (in Thousand Metric) of Wheat and Wheat Flour Under U.S GSM-I02 and -103
Programs, Fiscal Years 1990/91 - 94/95.
U.S. GSM-I02 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95
730
50
730
5,850
290
4,500
26
4,500
4,293
592
734
734
5,647
994
4,813
103
4,813
935
5,900
318
576
576
3,800
100
3,800
1,000
3,994
1,000
6,004
158
703
51
703
3,700
4,396
981
5,807
47
866
128
866
4,206
1,200
5,692
4,600
Algeria ~.
Total Market Imports' 4,600 3,700
Program Importsb 1,800 1,500
Egypt
Total Market Imports'
Program Importsb
Jordan
Total Market Imports'
Progam Importsb
South Korea
Total Market Imports·
~ Program Importsb
U.S. GSM-I03
Algeria
Total Market Imports·
Program lmportsb
Jordan
Total Market Imports·
Progam Importsb
Based on data from FAS, USDA
·Based on trade year July - June.
bBased on fiscal year October - September.
~
Table 8. US and Competitor Available Export Programs
Exporter
United States
European Union
Australia
Canada
Argentina
Export ProKrams
GSM-102/l03 (credit guarantees)
Export Enhancement Program (EEP),
1985-1995
PL480 (food aid)
Coface (credit guarantees)
Export Restitutions (subsidies)
Food Aid
Export Finance and Insurance Program
(credit guarantees)
Food Aid
Credit Grain Sales Program
Food Aid
Free Market Exports
Source: Based on Data from FAS, USDA Grain: WorJdMarkets and Trade
•
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Table 9.
Country
Buying Characteristics of Target Importing Countries.
Type of Buyer U.s. Program
Egypt
Algeria
Jordan
South Korea
Philippines
CommerciaVCon~~ssional
CommerciaVConcessional
CommerciaVConcessional
CommerciaVConcessional
'Concessional
EEP/GSM-I02/PL-480
EEP/GSM-I02; I03/PL-480
EEP/GSM-I02/PL-480
EEP/GSM-I02
EEP/PL-480
~
N
Japan Cash
Source: Based on data from FAS, USDA
~
Table 10. Demand Characteristics of Studied Import Markets
~
Yo) Japan 6 MMTs2 32 kg 90
Source: Based on data from FAS, USDA Unpublished Attache Annual Reports
1 5 Year Average of July/June Marketing Year
2 Million Metric Tons
3 Thousand Metric Tons
4 Per Capita Per Year
5 Will be reduced to 1.8% by Year 2004 under World Trade Organization regulations
6White Wheat
7 Hard Red Winter
8 Soft Red Winter
9Hard Red Spring
10 Dark Northern Spring
11 Durum
•
Import Market Total Market Consumption4 % of cons.
Imports l Imported
Algeria 4 MMTs2 230 kg 60
Egypt 6 MMTs2 180 kg 70
Jordan 700 TMTs3 15 kg 90
South Korea 4 MMTs2 35 kg 100
Philippines 2 MMTs2 26 kg 85
Import
Policies
21 % tariff/fees
3% tariff/fees5
Feed Wheat Class Demanded
Use
<3% HRW7/WW6
<15% WW6/HRW7/SRW8
<5% HRW7/SRW8/HRS9
50% HRW7/SRW8/HRS9/WW6
<5% DNS 1O/WW6
<10% HRW7/HRS9/WW6/Durum11
~ ..~~~. "~:.:.~~=~:~;:~~ -' ~:<"~-i;:-~?~:~~'~'~_-.~~-'~::-:_~~_ .~~
PAPER II
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF WHEAT AND
WHEAT FLOUR IN
5 SELECTED IMPORTING COUNTRIES:
THE CASE OF GOVERNMENT ASSISTED IMPORTERS
VERSUS CASH IMPORTERS.
Introduction
The extended government role in international trade ofwheat and wheat flour has
been the subject of controversy for many years. The primary suppliers of wheat and wheat
flour to the international market offer government assisted programs to target import
markets in order to promote their respective wheat industries. A large portion of world
wheat and flour trade is managed under government assistance. In the United States, up
to appre.&imately 80 percent of all international wheat transactions are made under some
government program (USDA, 1996b). Furthermore, very few wheat countries have
import programs that rely on cash purchasing.
Import demand ofwheat and wheat flour has changed dramatically over the last
twenty years. In the 1970s and 1980s when world wheat trade was growing to record
levels, the fonner Soviet Union (FSU), the European Union (EU), and China were the
driving forces behind the demand growth (USDA, 1995-97). However, more recently,
economic refonn, improvements in production self-sufficiency, and highly regulated
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agricultural policies have alluded to a reduction ofwheat and flour import programs in
these traditional import markets. Currently, the markets underpinning import demand
growth have been from Africa, Asia (outside of China) and Middle Eastern regions
(USDA, 1995-97).
Little effort has been made in previous literature to estimate wheat and wheat flour
international import behavior of individual countries in these regions. Moreover, previous
research has not focused on wheat and wheat flour import demand elasticities and how the
purchasing behavior of specific importers impact the factors affecting import demand.
Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Japan, and South Korea are a few of the top importing countries
in these respective regions that are underpinning import demand growth. Each of these
importers have different buying patterns and participate in different U.S. and competitor
government programs that influence the purchase decision and the origin of supply.
Import demand elasticities would provide valuable information to trade economists of
wheat and wheat flour from various sources and therefore would shed light on factors
affectin the competitive position of major suppliers in these markets. Moreover, the
overall objective of this study is to provide accurate estimates of wheat and wheat flour
(where applicable) import demand elasticities from these selected importing countries.
More specifically these elasticities will be used to compare the factors affecting demand
between government assisted and cash importers. Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, South Korea,
and Japan have been chosen for this study because of their importance in international
wheat and flour trade and their different import purchasing behavior. Both wheat and
flour will be included in this study for Algeria, Egypt, and Jordan, and only wheat will be
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analyzed for South Korea and Japan. The reason for this inconsistency in estimation is
that Algeria, Egypt, and Jordan import substantial quantities ofboth wheat and wheat
flour, while Japan and South Korea are major importers ofwheat. Less than 1 percent of
the group expenditure on wheat and wheat flour in South Korea and Japan is used to
import wheat flour. Therefore, wheat flour is eliminated from the estimation of South
Korea and Japan. Table 1 gives the summary statistics of the expenditure in each import
market used for wheat and wheat flour imports.
Accurate import demand elasticities are an important feature of international
agricultural research. Policy makers and trade economists rely on precise estimates of
demand responses to prices and expenditure to make timely policy decisions and
simulations. Recent studies by Yang and Koo, Capps, Tsai, et al, and Hayes, Wahl, and
Williams have focused on meat demand in Japan and other Pacific Rim countries. Wilson
estimated wheat demand with a transcendental demand function that differentiated U.S.,
Canadian, and Australian wheat by class, but only in Pacific Rim countries. Very little
research 'las focused on import demand for wheat and wheat flour and the competition
among different sources in the individual importing countries that are targeted for this
study. Neither has any study differentiated the cash buyers from the government assisted
importers.
This study uses the restricted Source Differentiated Almost Ideal Demand System
(RSDAIDS) used by Yang and Koo. The model is restricted because the general demand
restrictions (homogeneity and symmetry) are imposed on the data. In the RSDAIDS
model, quantities, values and prices of imported wheat and wheat flour are differentiated
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by source of supply and the expenditure is treated as endogenous (Lafrance). Estimations
by Yang and Koo, Capps, et al, and Hayes et al do not concentrate on wheat and wheat
flour or these specified importing countries. The wheat demand elasticities estimated by
Wilson provide infonnation about the competition among wheat classes, not among the
major exporters and only in the Pacific Rim importing countries. The addition ofwheat
flour elasticities and a variety of importers across geographical regions makes an
important contribution to the literature.
This study is organized as follows. The following section discusses government
assistance received by the targeted import markets and also the competition among the
export suppliers. The demand model considerations of previous literature are described in
the third section, while in the fourth section the restricted Source Differentiated Almost
Ideal Demand System (RSDAIDS), the model chosen for this study, is specified. In the
fifth section the estimation, data and results are presented. In the sixth and final section,
the summary and conclusions and policy implications of the study are presented.
Import Behavior of Target Markets
Government Assisted Importers
Over the last twenty years, Algeria, Egypt and Jordan have received substantial
amounts ofU.S. government assistance to import wheat and wheat flour. All three
countries have participated in one or aU of the U.S. programs: the Export Enhancement
Program (EEP), General Sales Manager credit guarantee programs (GSM 102 and 103),
and Public Law 480 (PL480). These three programs that apply to wheat also apply to
wheat flour. Over the past 20 years, Egypt and Jordan have imported up to 100 percent
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of total wheat and wheat flour imports from the U.S. under EEP (USDA, 1996a). The
portion ofAlgeria's wheat and wheat flour imports that are under the U.S. government
programs have been mainly under the GSM-I02 and 103 programs. Over the last 10
years, an average of40 percent of Algeria's wheat and flour imports from the U.S. have
been under U.S. credit guarantees (USDA, 1996b). Table 2 provides the actual amount of
wheat, in thousand metric tons, imported under the United States General Sales Manager
program during Fiscal Years 1990/91 and 1994/95 for Algeria, Egypt, and Jordan. Total
market imports, including cash, concessional, and commercial purchases are also included
in this table, however comparisons can not be made between the data because ofthe time
ofyear the data are reported. Credit program units are reported in Fiscal Year (October-
September), while the total market imports are reported on a Trade Year (July-June).
Wheat and wheat flour gifts or purchases from the U.S. of all five countries under PL480
have been the smallest amount ofimports under aU U.S. government programs (USDA,
1996b). Accurate time-series data of imports under the PL480 and EEP programs for
these tm e participating countries are not readily available from any consistent data
source. Also, due to the sensitive nature of import programs, specific infonnation about
the competitor programs is unavailable. However, credit guarantee programs, price-
differentiating mechanisms, and export subsidies have and continue to be offered by export
competitors to these target importing countries.
Cash Importers
South Korea and Japan are considered cash importers. Japan imports wheat only
by cash purchases. In past years, South Korea has imported wheat under credit
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guarantees (see Table 2) and EEP, however these government assisted purchases have
been minimal. South Korean wheat imports under these programs have been less than 20
percent of total market imports from the U.S. Recently, South Korea's participation in
these programs was phased out; therefore, for this study South Korea will be treated as a
cash buyer.
Export Competition of Major Suppliers
The competition between different sources of supply ofwheat and wheat flour has
been intensifying in these selected import markets. Production and export levels of wheat
and flour in the top wheat supplying countries have increased to record levels over the
past tweny years. The United States, the European Union (EU), Australia, and Canada
are the top suppliers ofwheat and flour to the five import markets selected for this study.
These four exporters have been increasing their efforts to gain market share in each of
these import markets in order to achieve a competitive advantage. An exporting country
is considered as having a competitive advantage in the export market if it consistently
exports' oods to the international market place earlier than other competing countries
(Rose). Gaining a competitive advantage is usually achieved by offering high quality
wheat at an affordable price. The government assisted programs offered to import
markets by the competing suppliers directly affects the price of the goods and the
importers decision to purchase wheat and flour from any origin supplier. All four
competitors offer some type of assistance to import markets to promote their product,
however each country has been focusing on certain target regions to market their wheat
and wheat flour (USDA, 1995-97).
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The European Union (EU) offers subsidies, credit sales, and food aid to promote
EU wheat. The ED is the only exporter that offers substantial amounts of assistance
comparable to the U.S. This assistance is heavily targeted for exports to Africa and the
Middle East. The focus on these markets is primarily due to the proximity between
Europe and these regions. Because of the nearby location and the government assisted
programs, the EU is better able to meet these countries' import needs in the quantity
feasible for the port facilities, at a lower price because of the shorter distance to transport,
and in a timely manner (USDA, 1995-97).
Canada and Australia's wheat and flour exports are managed by single desk-selling
wheat boards. The Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) and the Australian Wheat Board
(AWB) are referred to as single desk-selling because they are the only entity in each
respective country with the authority to export wheat and flour. Because the wheat is
pooled together and sold by one entity to the international market, the wheat boards are
able to offer competitive prices to international buyers. In addition, the Canadian and
Australi r 1 Wheat Boards (CWB and AWB) do offer food aid and credit sales to importing
countries, however the amount of assistance offered under these programs is small. The
minimal amount of assistance is focused on primarily the Asian region. In the 19705 and
early 1980s the main import market for these two exporters was the former Soviet Union
(FSU). When the FSU reduced their wheat and flour import programs, Canada and
Australia began to focus on exporting to Asia. Also, Canada and Australia focus on this
region because of the large growth in import demand and also because of the distinctive
consumption needs. Furthermore, CWB and AWB have recently been focusing on
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improving the quality ofwheat and flour and increasing the marketing activities in the
Asian region. New "designer" wheat varieties are being introduced in both countries to
satisfy the tastes and preferences of the Asian consumer (USDA, 1995-97).
The United States is the largest provider of government assistance to the
international market. Import assistance from the U.S. in allocated in the form ofthe
Export Enhancement Program (EEP), PL480, and GSM-1 0211 03. EEP subsidies were
administered by the U.S. government from 1985 to 1995. As of July 1995, EEP was
eliminated. During the ten year period, EEP subsidies were used to maintain U.S. wheat
and flour market share and to counter-act the price-cutting subsidies of the EU The
PL480 program is the U.S: government concessional sales programs. Purchases made
under this program are either food aid donations for humanitarian food needs, government
to goverment sales under 30 year credit for developing countries and/or government to
government grants to least developed countries for economic development. GSM-
102/103 (General Sales Manager) are the commercial credit guarantee programs offered
by the U. . government through the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). Under these
programs, the CCC guarantees payments due from approved foreign banks for credit
terms up to three (GSM-102) and ten (GSM-103) years. The US. does not target a
specific region, but simply offers these available programs to importing countries that need
assistance in attaining the proper consumption needs. Despite the large amount of
assistance offered to importing markets, the U.S. is considered the residual supplier of
wheat and wheat flour. Because US. wheat and flour is the highest priced of all the
competitors, import markets first purchase high-quality, lower-priced wheat from other
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competing suppliers (i.e. ED, Caoanda, and Australia) and then purchase their remaining
consumption needs from the U.S. In other words, the U.S. plays the role of being the
supplier of the last resort.
Demand theory explains that price and quality are the two main factors which
determine the importer's decision to purchase wheat from various sources. Furthennore,
quantity demanded is a function of prices and income with the world market prices
determined by supply and demand factors within a given market. Therefore, the price and
quality ofany origin wheat available to the international market are among the factors that
determine which export competitor can be the "first" supplier of wheat to the international
market.
Model Considerations
The RSDAIDS model has been used infrequently in international demand system
models. Previous studies of demand theory have specified the Armington or Rotterdam
models (Alston, Carter, et al and Capps, Tsai, et al). The Armington and the RSDAIDS
models ~ aintain a similar advantage in that both assume imperfect substitutability among
goods from different sources of supply (Yang and Koo). The assumptions of block
separability and product aggregation are inherent in the Armington model and are usually
assumed in the empirical application of the AIDS model. Block separability assumes that
goods are not differentiated by source of supply and product aggregation allows the model
to consist only of share equations for a good from different origins (Yang and Koo).
These assumptions are not inherent in the restricted SDAIDS model. The Armington
model also suffers from homotheticity and single constant elasticities of substitutions
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(Yang and Koo) and in the study by Alston, Carter, et ai, the Armington model was
rejected for cotton and wheat using three alternative testing approaches. The RSDAIDS
modd is flexible, easy to use and the general demand restrictions (homogeneity and
symmetry) are easily enforced if they do not hold for the unrestricted model. Also, the
adding-up condition is inherent in the model.
This study uses the RSDAIDS model to estimate wheat demand in Japan and
South Korea (recall that these two importers import very little wheat flour) and both
wheat and wheat flour demand in Algeria, Egypt, and Jordan. Commodity differentiation
among sources of supply is important in wheat and flour import demand analysis in order
to measure the competition between exporters. The RSDAIDS model also allows the
relationship between wheat and wheat flour to be measured. In the estimation of Japanese
meat import demand, Yang and Koo assumed that agricultural products can be aggregated
together if all prices move together by the same proportion. This was not the case for the
demand for meat products. Because of quality differences, countries view commodities
from die; rent sources of supply differently (Yang and Koo). In the extremely unique case
of wheat and wheat flour, price distorting mechanisms used by export competitors (such
as export subsidies and price segmentation by commodity boards, i.e. selling wheat at
different prices in the domestic and international markets) and different transportation
costs cause irregular movements of import prices. Homogeneous import price movements
among sources seem unlikely for wheat and wheat flour. Similarly, Alston, Carter, et al
tested the inherent assumption of block separability (model consists only of share
equations for a good from different souces) in the Annington model for wheat and cotton
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and concluded that this assumption results in biased demand elasticities.
The RSDAIDS is the model chosen for this study because block separability and
product aggregation are not inherent in the model. Recall that the model is referred to as
restricted because the general restrictions of demand are imposed on the data. In this
study the RSDAIDS model is applied to each importing country separately (Algeria,
Egypt, Jordan, South Kore~ and Japan).
Specified Model
The RSDAIDS model is the model specified for this study and was derived from
Deaton and Meullbauers's AIDS model (Yang and Koo). Block substitutability is
assumed as a maintained hypothesis for those countries importing flour (Algeria, Egypt,
and Jordan). Block substitutability assumption means that cross-price effects with regard
to demand for any good in i will be the same with respect to the price of good j from
different origins. In this study, the block substitutability refers to the cross price effect
between the two goods (wheat and wheat flour). This hypothesis is assumed only in the
country ;aodels that are estimated with both wheat and wheat flour (Algeria, Egypt, and
Jordan). The RSDAIDS model with both wheat and wheat flour is specified as:
(1 )
The RSDAIDS model for Japan and South Korea that excludes the wheat flour
good and also the block substitutability assumption is specified as:
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The only difference between the two model specifications is the elirnation of the block
substitutability assumption in equation (2). This assumption is elimated because South
Korea and Japan do not import wheat flour. In both models, Wi}, is the market share
percentage of good i from source h in each import market, calculated as (Pi}, *q;;)/E; Pill is
the price of the good i from source j measured in the import market domestic currency per
metric ton; q;h is the quantity of the good i imported from source j measured in thousand
metric tons; i,j denote goods (wheat and wheat flour); h, k denote products (sources of
supply; the number of sources may differ in each importing country); E is the total
expenditures on goods i and j by an importing country measured in the import market
domestic currency; a, P, y are parameters; p* is the Stone's index defined by IJ:h Wihl.1
In (Pill); and In (P)=LkWjkt.J In (Pjk); In general the RSDAIDS model has M+(N-l)+2
paramet rs to be estimated in each equation with M being the number of supply sources,
N being the number ofgoods, plus the constant, and the expenditure parameter (Yang and
Koo).
The Marshallian and Hicksian elasticities of the RSDAIDS model used by Yang
and Koo are:
r ihih
Y ihh
= -1 + - ~ ih
Wih
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6 ihih
Y ihh
= -1 + + W.W
ih
1:
E: ihik °ihik
Y ihk
= -1 + + WW
ih
k
f ihj
Y ihk
=
W· h1.
Y ihk
= -1 + + Wj
Wih
Where E denotes Marshallian elasticities and adenotes the Hicksian or income
compensated elasticities.
Expenditure elasticity is:
l3 ih
= 1 +
The general demand conditions are specified as:
Adding-up:
Symmetry:
Homogt.-deity:
Because product aggregation (goods are not differentiated by source) is not a
characteristic of the RSDAIDS model, and each of the individual country models were
estimated differentiating goods by source of supply, it is assumed that the decision of the
importer to purchase wheat and wheat flour is independent of the decision to purchase any
other food or feed grain (i.e. rice, com, etc.). Therefore, wheat and wheat flour can be
assumed separately from aU other grains. Furthermore, it is assumed that wheat and
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wheat flour can be estimated within the same system because of the nature ofwheat to be
milled into wheat flour for the final consumable good.
Data, Estimation and Testing Procedures
Data Description
Annual data for wheat and wheat flour for 1970 through 1993 were used for this
study. Wheat and wheat flour were imported from different sources with a different
number of supply sources. The data for import quantity (metric tons) and value (in U.S.
dollars) were obtained from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Foreign
Agricultural Service United Nations calendar year trade data. The quantities and values in
this data set were reported by the importing country and represent all of the costs of the
imported goods, i.e. cost, insurance, freight (c.i.f.). These data also include the quantities
and values of the goods imported under government assisted programs (EEP, GSM-
1021103, PL480). The exchange rate and the Gross Domestic Product of each country
were provided by the International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics
Yearboc' .
•
Among the three importing countries importing both wheat and wheat flour, wheat
is by far the leading import. The U.S., Canada, Australia, and the European Union were
the major suppliers ofwheat to these importing countries. All other exporting countries
were combined into a rest ofworld export source. The statistics of the expenditure share
for each good and source of each country are summarized in Tables 3,4, 5, and 6.
Algeria and Egypt both have four wheat sources and three wheat flour sources. The
United States, the European Union, and Rest of the World supply wheat to both countries,
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while Canada is a supply origin to Algeria (Table 3), and Australia is a supply origin to
Egypt (Table 4). Both countries receive wheat flour from the United States, the European
Union and the Rest ofWorld. Jordan has two main wheat suppliers with the U.S.
providing slightly over 44 percent and the Rest ofWorld 26 percent. The European
Union is the leading flour source accounting for 12 percent while the U.S. and ROW
provide 9 and 7 percent respectively (Table 5). In each of these countries, the U.S. is the
predominate supplier of wheat, while the European Union is the dominating source of
wheat flour. In South Korea, wheat from the United States accounts for almost 80
percent of the market share. Canada and Rest ofWorld combined supply the remaining
15 percent. The United States supplies just over 50 percent of Japan's total imports, with
Canada and Australia accounting for 27 and 17 percent respectively of this market (Table
6).
Estimation Procedures
The import demand model for Algeria, Egypt, and Jordan include 2 goods, wheat
and whe4t flour, with different numbers of sources of supply. The models for Japan and
South Korea include 1 good, wheat. A system ofequations for South Korea and Japan
including both wheat and wheat flour and assuming block substitutability was also
estimated. However, because both countries spend less than 1 percent of total group
expenditure on wheat flour, the elasticities representing the cross commodity relationship
were conceptually and empirically inferior. Furthermore, the price and income elasticities
of both estimations showed the same pattern of response, therefore the block
substitutability assumption'was eliminated and the cross commodity elasticities are not
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reported for these countries. The number of sources for each good in each country
include: Algeria--4 sources for wheat and 3 sources for wheat flour~ Egypt--S and 3
sources for wheat and wheat flour respectively~ and Jordan--3 and 4 sources for wheat and
wheat flour respectively. Both South Korea and Japan have 3 sources for wheat. The
major sources of supply for wheat and wheat flour are the United States, Canada,
Australia, the European Union, and Rest of the World. The supply sources were chosen
in each importing country if a particular country provided at least 5 percent of the good
based on the mean value of the selected time period. All other sources were combined in
the Rest of the World category.
Algeria and Egypt are estimated with 7 equations (seven sources for wheat and
wheat flour), while Jordan has 5, and South Korea and Japan both have 3. An equation
was dropped in each country model for estimation purposes in order to avoid the problem
of singularity due to the adding up condition. The Rest of the World equation was
dropped in each of the countries except for Japan. The Rest of the World supplies Japan
with les' than I percent ofall wheat imports therefore was not considered a supply
source. Australia was the dropped equation in the Japanese model. The parameters of the
omitted equations were obtained by imposing the adding up restriction. Each model was
estimated with Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR).
The import prices in U.S. dollars per metric ton for wheat and wheat flour were
calculated by dividing the u.s. dollar values by the quantity of the good imported in
metric tons. These unit prices were converted to the domestic currency of each country
by multiplying the U. S. prices by the respective exchange rate. Market shares ofeach
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supply origin were detennined by multiplying the total import quantity by the domestic
currency unit price and then dividing by the total import expenditures in the importing
country domestic currency for a product group (wheat or wheat and wheat flour). Stone's
index in the RSDAIDS model is the sum of the lagged market shares multiplied by the
natural log of the prices for the products in each model. The lagged market shares are
used to avoid the endogeneity with respect to price index and to avoid empirical
difficulties of annual time-series data (Green and Alston).
Testing Procedures
The null hypothesis of expenditure endogeneity is tested and examined for each
model. Also, the Likelihood Ratio Test is used to test each of the general demand
restrictions before application to the models and system misspecification testing
procedures as suggested by McGuirk, Driscoll, et. al. were used and examined before
estimation.
Because the endogenous market share variable is used to calculate the expenditure,
the expt. lditure may also be endogenous when estimating any AIDS model. Expenditure
endogeneity may cause certain biases and inconsistencies within the model (Lafrance).
This study uses the Wu-Hausman test as suggested in Blundel to determine if the
expenditure can be treated as exogenous. This procedure requires the expenditure
variable In(EIP*) to be tested by estimating the foUowing single equation with Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) estimation:
EIn(-)
p'
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'ffl
where t=time, Y is Gross Domestic Product (GOP), E is total group import expenditure,
p* is Stone's index and Dihl is a random error tenn. This error teon was included in each
of the RSDAIDS equations. The models were run to determine the effect ofthe residual
(v;J on total group expenditure. The Wald Chi-Square statistic was used to complete the
endogeneity test. These test statistics for each model are reported in Table 7. Results
from this test indicate that The Wu-Hausman test cannot reject the Null hypothesis that
the expenditures in each ofthe models are not correlated with the error tenns. These tests
confirm that the expenditure variable can be treated as exogenous.
The Likelihood Ratio test is used to test the general demand restrictions. This
testing procedure is used because it perfonns well with small samples. The Likelihood
Ratio test statistic compares the unrestricted model to the restricted model and measures
whether the data can conform to each ofthe general restrictions. The results of these tests
indicate that the data conforms to both Homogeneity and Symmetry in Japan and South
Korea, while the data in Algeria confonns to Homogeneity and the data in Egypt and
Jordan (. nfonn to symmetry. These restrictions are enforced on the data in the respective
models.
McGuirk, Driscoll, et. al suggest a thorough misspecification testing strategy prior
to the estimation of a full system ofequations. In order to evaluate theory using
econometrics, the theory must be viewed in the context of a valid statistical model and
verify that the assumptions in the model are adequate for the data used in the estimation
procedures. These system tests relate to the distribution and moments of the observable
random variables and take into consideration infonnation in, and interactions between all
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equations within a system (McGuirk, Driscoll, et. al.) Testing procedures for functional
form, parameter stability, hornoscedasticity, and autocorrelation are performed for the
system as well as for each individual equation. McGuirk, Driscoll, et al define each of
these assumptions as follows: (1) Functional fonn: conditional mean of the exogenous
(independent) variables are linear in form; (2) Parameter stability: exogenous variables do
not vary over time; (3) Autocorrelation: randomly distributed error terms are not related
to lagged (or previous) error terms; (4) Static heteroskedasticity: error terms do not
have a dependent relationship with the exogenous variables; and (5) Dynamic
heteroskedasticity: error terms are related to the exogenous (independent) and
endogenous (independent) variables. The results (in the form ofp-values) ofthe
misspecification testing regime are presented in tables A through G in the appendix. The
smaller the p-value, the more evidence against the assumption(s) holding (McGuirk,
DriscoJJ, et.a1). The results of the misspecification tests for Algeria, Egypt, and Jordan are
more significant than expected because of the relatively small and variable amounts of
wheat fic/ur imported by these import markets each year. The results of the cash importers
(South Korea and Japan) are as expected because of the elimination of the wheat flour
good.
Import Market Estimation Results
The Marshaliian and Hicksian demand elasticities as well as the income elasticities
are reported for each individual country in this section. Marshallian demand elasticities
refer to the percentage change in quantity demanded for a product due to a I percent
change in price when demand is expressed as a function of prices and income. Hicksian
62
demand elasticities are derived as the percentage change in quantity demanded due to a 1
percent change in the price of a product when the demand is expressed as a function of
prices and utility (utility is held constant). The interpretation ofHicksian demand
elasticities differs from Marshallian elasticities. The Hicksian own and cross-price
elasticities are a function of the import markets' utility as opposed to income in
Marshallian elasticities. The Hicksian elasticities reflect the tastes and preferences of the
import markets' consumption habits. A consumer's (the consumer in this study is the
import market) utility function will not change over a short period oftime as a result of
price and income changes. Moreover, Hicksian demand results give a long-term view of
how changes in prices affect the quantiy demanded by the consumer in respect to the
amount of utility the consumer receives from the particular good (wheat and/or wheat
flour). The signs of the Hicksian elasticities are expected to be symmetric throughout
each elasticity matrix in each individual country model. Significant non-symmetric price
elasticities signify price movements in different directions and also that the data may not
conforo. to all the general demand restrictions. Recall from the testing procedures that all
of the restrictions did not hold for each individual import market model. In the following
discussion ofestimation results, only the Marshallian demand elasticities are mentioned,
however the Hicksian demand elasticities are presented for the reader.
The Marshallian cross price elasticities show the type of relationship among
suppliers. A significant positive cross price elasticity indicates a competitive relationship
between sources of supply. A significant negative cross price elasticity reveals a
complementary relationship between suppliers. Complementary relationships can be
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expected due to the importers behavior ofblending th~different types ofwheat for the
milling ofwheat flour. Also, international consumers may blend either wheat or flour of
lower quality with high-quality wheat to ensure the consumable quality of the final
product.
Cross-price elasticities between goods show the type ofrelationship among wheat
and wheat flour. A negative elasticity reveals a complementary relationship which implies
that a price increase in one good results in a declining in quantity demanded of the other
good. A positive cross-product elasticity reveals that the two products will substitute for
each other.
Algeria Import Market for Wheat and Wheat Flour
Tables 8, 8a, and 8b include the Marshallian and Hicksian demand elasticities and
parameter estimates for Algerian wheat and wheat flour import demand using a RSDAIDS
model. The system R2 for Algeria is .9903. All own price elasticities have the expected
signs and all were significant except for Canada's wheat price and ROW flour price. All
of the in...ome elasticities have the expected signs and are significant. The ED and the U.S.
are in a favorable trading position in wheat and wheat flour respectively, because each
have an income elasticity greater than 1 (EU--1.123; U.S.--l.091). This implies that as
Algeria's income level increases, EU wheat exports and U.S. wheat flour exports will also
increase to Algeria. Because all of the expenditure elasticities are highly significant, all
wheat and wheat flour exports from all suppliers would increase to this market with an
increase in Algerian income.
In this market, the supply competition is among the U.S., EU, and ROW. Wheat
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from the ROW provides the greatest competition for US exports (.4404), because it is the
only positive significant cross-price elasticity for the US. The U.S. wheat provides the
most significant competition for EU exports (2.388). Also, EU wheat exports exhibit
competition for ROW wheat exports (1.495). Stronger competition between exporters
exists in flour trade. Competition among the U.S. and EU is the strongest with positive
and significant cross-price elasticities of5.519 and 2.312 respectively. Also, the ED
provides the only competition to ROW flour (3.232). Flour from the ROW has a
complementary relationship with European Union flour based on the significant cross-
price elasticity of -.8877. Wheat has a significant complementary relationships with flour
from the U.S., EU, and ROW, and flour is a'substitute for ROW wheat.
Egypt Import Market for Wheat and Wheat Flour
Tables 9, 9a, and 9b present the Marshallian and Hicksian elasticities and
parameter estimates for Egypt wheat and wheat flour import demand using the RSDAIDS
model. The system R2 for Egypt is .9599. All own-price elasticities have the expected sign
and all a-:e significant except for U. S. and EU wheat and ROW flour. These significant
own-price relationships are very elastic and reflect that the quantities of wheat and flour
are very responsive to price changes. All income elasticities are positive and significant at
the 1 percent level. Australia and ROW are in a favorable trading position in wheat, with
elasticities of 1.003 and 1.085 respectively U.S. wheat flour is also in a favorable trading
position with an income elasticity of 1.033. Wheat and flour exports of all competitors
would benefit from an income increase in Egypt because all income elasticities are
significantly positive.
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The cross-price elasticities show that the EU and Australia are engaged in the
greatest competition for wheat exports to Egypt. Australia's wheat exports would
increase from a price decrease in the EU (2.585). Similarly, the EU would benefit from an
increase in the price of Australian wheat (1.343). Very little competition exists among
suppliers of wheat flour. ROW flour has a slight substitute relationship with US flour
(.6321) and ROW flour exports would benefit from a price increase in US flour.
The cross-product price elasticities shows that flour has a complementary
relationship to U. S. wheat ~d also wheat is complementary to flour in all competitive
countries.
Jordan Import Market for Wheat and Wheat Flour
Tables 10, lOa, and lOb present the MarshaUian and Hicksian elasticities and
parameter estimates for Jordan wheat and wheat flour import demand using the RSDAIDS
model. The system R2 for Jordan is .9850. The signs of the own price elasticities are as
expected except for ROW wheat, however not all are significant. The U.S. wheat and
flour ow:.-price elasticities are significant at the I percent level (-1.674 and -3.719).
These elasticities show that Jordan's decision to import from the U.S. is very price
responsive. All the income elasticities are positive, but only the U.S. wheat and EU flour
elasticities are significant, also at the 1 percent level (1.438 and 1.486). The cross-price
elasticities do not have the expected signs and are not significant. These results reveal that
the U.S. dominates both the wheat and flour market and there is no price responsiveness
from other suppliers. Cross-product elasticities show that flour is a complement to wheat
in both the US and ROW (-.1926 and -.3066 respectively) and also wheat has a
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complementary relationship with flour in the EU (-.9415). This implies that U.S. and
ROW wheat exports would benefit from a decrease in the price offlour.
South Korea Import Market for Wheat
Tables 11, 11a, and 11b present the Marshallian and Hicksian elasticities and
parameter estimates for South Korea wheat import demand using the RSDAIDS model.
The system R2 for South Korea is .9850. The own-price elasticity signs in the U.S. and
Canada are negative as expected, however only the U.S. own-price is significant (-.6772).
All income elasticities are positive, but only Canada and ROW are significant (both at the
1 percent level). Both Canada (4.030) and ROW (1. 780) wheat exports would benefit
greatly from an increase in income in South Korea.
Cross price-elasticities show that the greatest competition among exporters exists
between ROWand the U.S. U.S. wheat is a substitute for ROW wheat (1.1719), while
Canadian wheat is complementary to ROW wheat (-2.684).
Japan Import Market for Wheat
'!:' bles 12, 12a, and 12b present the Marshallian and Hicksian elasticities and
parameter estimates for Japan wheat import 'demand using the RSDAIDS model. The
system R2 for Japan is .6799. The own-price elasticities are all significantly negative for
U.S., Canada, and Australia (-1.468, -.4881, and -2.346 respectively). Also, all the
income elasticities are positive as expected. Canada and Australia's income elasticities are
significant at the 10 and 1 percent significance level respectively. However, Australia is
the only competitor with an income elasticity greater than 1 and Australia's wheat exports
would benefit from an income increase in Japan (1.643).
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The cross-price elasticities show that the U. S. and Canada have a complementary
relationship. Both elasticities are significantly negative (U.S. equation: -.3188; Canada
equation: -.4666). Australian wheat is a substitute for U.S. wheat with a significantly
positive cross-price elasticity of .9612.
Summary and Conclusions
The results from the RSDAIDS models for Algeria. Egypt. Jordan, South Korea,
and Japan provide valuable information about wheat and wheat flour trade and the
competition among suppliers. An exporter was considered as having a favorable trading
position when income elasticity is elastic and own-price elasticity is inelastic. According
to this criterion, U.S. flour is competitive in Egypt and ED flour is competitive in Jordan.
The strength of competition between exporters is measured by the magnitude and
significance of the cross-price elasticity. The elasticity between wheat supplied by the
U.S. and ED wheat (2.388) in Algeria indicates the most intense competition in all import
markets. Also in Algeria, flour supplied by the ED is competitive with U.S. flour (5.519).
T.be results among government assisted purchasing and cash buyers differ as
expected. In Egypt, Algeria and Jordan, where the majority of the goods are imported
under assistance, the expenditure elasticities are highly significant and are just around 1 for
each ofthe competitors. It is worthy to note that these three countries continue to pursue
economic development and rely on income to make import purchases. Another result of
this study is that the price relationships in these three markets are not as significant
compared to the developed markets of South Korea and Japan. Perhaps this is becasue
these are developing countries which rely on assistance from supplying governments to
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meet the consumption needs in these respective countries. The price elasticity results
show that quantity ofwheat and flour imported from a particular supply source by each
government assisted importer is affected by the the price of the supplying source and the
price of only one additional competitor. The significant own and cross-price elasticities in
each market correspond to the supplier that offers the most government assistance.
Therefore, the competitive relationships among suppliers are as expected in these markets.
The U.S. and EU are the significant competitors in each of these markets. The EU offers
export restitutions and a credit line comparable to the U.S. credit guarantee programs
(USDA, 1995-97). The competition between the US and the EU in these government
assisted markets can also be explained by the class of wheat purchased by these markets.
Both Algeria and Egypt are consumers of large quantities of white wheat. The majority of
wheat produced for export in the U.S. is Hard Red Winter. This puts the U.S. at a
competitive disadvantage to other exporters (EU, Canada and Australia) who produce
more of this variety. Algeria and Egypt will consistently purchase wheat from the white
wheat pr ducers before purchasing other varieties from the U.S. Jordan's preferred
classes of wheat are Hard Red Winter, Hard Red Spring, and Soft Red Winter. The U.S.
is the main supplier of Hard Red Winter, which is reflected in the price elasticities (USDA,
1996a).
Japan's cross price elasticities in the U.S. are highly significant and reflect the
consistent buying of wheat from the three major exporters. In contrast, Canada and
Australia's cross price elasticities are not as significant as might be expected. Over the
last 10 years, Japan consumption patterns have remained relatively stable and Japan
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purchases roughly the same amount ofwheat from the U.S., Canada, and Australia.
Wheat purchases from all three suppliers have followed the same pattern. Despite
dramatic swings in price movement, Japan's continuity of purchasing roughly the same
amount ofwheat from each supply will remain (USDA, 1995-97).
South Korea seems to be the exception to expectations of cash buying behavior.
This import market is just recently making the transition from only a small amount of
government assistance to cash buying. The cross price elasticity results can be explained
by the factors affecting South Korea's purchasing decisions. The decision to purchase
wheat from any origin supplier, is based on quality equally to price. Approximately half of
all imports from the U. S. are for livestock feeding purchases and wheat for this purpose is
based on price. The wheat purchased for domestic food consumption is driven mainly by
quality. South Korea depends on a very high protein wheat for the milling and baking of
noodles for human consumption. The demand for this high quality wheat is being met by
Canada and Australia and displacing U. S. market share. Canada and Australia are
develop; g high-quality "designer" wheats targeted to the consumption needs of South
Korea as well as other Asian importers (USDA, 1996a).
Policy Implications
Results from this study have several important policy implications for the U.S.
wheat industry and local and national policy makers. One is that wheat and wheat flour
import demand from the high profiled import markets (Fonner Soviet Union, China, and
the European Union) of the 1970s and early 1980s has weakened over time. Consumption
needs in these countries are now being met by domestic supplies. Currently, wheat and
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wheat flour import demand is growing in markets in Africa, Asia (outside of China), and
the Middle East. In addition, the majority of these growing markets are also concentrating
on economic development and need assistance to purchase goods to satisfY the
consumption needs. Government assistance from the V. S. is expected to assist these
markets to achieve economic development and to create a positive political environment
that may lead to the development and maintainance of a successful relationship for
international trade. Another implication for national policy makers is the allocation of
Export Enhancement Program (EEP) funds. If supply and demand conditions in the world
wheat market necessitate the reimplementation ofEEP, the allocation of EEP money
would be used more economically efficient in those markets with highly elastic V.S. price
elasticities. The markets with elastic price elasticities are more sensitive to changes in the
price ofU.S. wheat and are likely to seek out the supplier offering the lowest price.
The second policy implication for policy makers is the importance of quality
specifications in cash buying markets. Quality plays an important role in the decision to
import fr m any origins of supply. While the U.S. is a consistent producer ofhigh-quality
wheat, Canada and Australia are gaining a distinct advantage with high-quality, designer
wheats. These supply competitors are making great strides in target regions, specifically
Asia, to meet the desired quality needs of the consumer. U.S. producers would benefit
greatly from developing and producing varieties and grades of wheat demanded by these
growing import markets. Also, identifying marketing strategies that would further increase
U.S. wheat exports to targeted markets. Although total U.S. wheat and flour market
share is not at the record high level once achieved in the early 1980s, the U. S. remains in a
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favorable trading position in the international wheat market. As the competition from
other suppliers intensifies, the U.S. wheat industry would benefit from assisting the
economic developing countries and increasing the marketing activities in the cash buying
countries.
Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research
There are several limitations within this study that give important implications for
further research. The first limitation is separability of wheat and wheat flour and other
food grains. In thi.s study, wheat and wheat flour are estimated in the same system and are
assumed separable from all other food grains. The separability of these commodity groups
are not tested and reported, but only assumed. Conducting these tests would contribute
additional support to the commodity groupings used in the study. The second limitation is
the exclusion of domestic production in each import demand model. Theory suggests that
domestic production affects the import decision of a particular market to import any good.
However, in this study, South Korea does not domestically produce wheat, and Japan's
domestic.production allocation is such that it does not change and does not affect the
import purchases of wheat. Domestic production in these particular markets would not be
an import demand factor. However, further research to determine if domestic production
would impact import programs in Algeria, Egypt, and Jordan would be an addition to the
literature. The third limitation is the calculated expenditure used for each demand system.
The expenditure used in this study is a calculation of the importing countries' group
expenditure on wheat and wheat flour (where applicable). The importer's total income
may be a better explanation of the expenditure used for importing the two goods. The
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validity of the two incomes may differ depending on which entity makes the import
purchases and whose utitily is being maximized (government agency versus private
industry).
&
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Table 1. Summary Statistics for Percentage ofExpenditure
Spent on Wheat and Wheat Flour in Selected Importing
Countries for 1970-1993.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Algeria
Wheat .9003 .1134 .4552 .9999
Wheat Flour .0580 .1134 .0000 .5447
Egypt
Wheat .6804 .1112 .4917 .9265
Wheat Flour .3195 1112 .0734 .5082
Jordan
Wheat .7115 .2829 .1896 .9951
Wheat Flour .2885 .2829 .0048 .8103
South Korea
Wheat .9891 .0186 .9191 1.0000
Wheat Flour .0108 .0186 .0000 .0808
Japan
Wheat .9999 .0000 .9999 .9999
Wheat Flour .0001 .0000 .0000 .0001
•
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Table 2. Imports (in Thousand Metric) of Wheat and Wheat Flour Under U.S. GSM-102 and -103
Programs, Fiscal Years 1990/91 - 94/95.
u.s. GSM-102 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95
Algeria
Total Market Imports"
Program Importsb
Egypt
Total Market Imports"
Program Importsb
Jordan
Total Market Imports"
Progam Importsb
South Korea
Total Market Imports"
::j Program Importsb
U.S. GSM-103
Algeria
Total Market Imports"
Program Importsb
Jordan
Total Market Imports"
Progam Importsb
4,600
1,800
5,692
866
4,206
1,200
4,600
866
128
3,700
1,500
5,807
47
703
4,396
981
3,700
703
51
3,800
1,000
6,004
158
576
3,994
1,000
3,800
100
576
4,813
935
5,900
318
734
5,647
994
4,813
103
734
4,500
26
5,850
290
730
50
4,293
592
4,500
730
Based on data from FAS, USDA
"Based on trade year July - June.
bBased on fiscal year October - September.
Table 3. Summary Statistics for Competitor Wheat and Wheat
Flour Market Share in Algeria for 1970-1993.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Wheat .9192 .1134 .4552 .9999
United States .4098 .1475 .1158 .6849
Canada .2735 .0888 .1038 .4791
European Union .1738 .1360 .0000 .4167
Rest ofWorld .0620 .0614 .0000 .2104
Wheat Flour .0807 .1134 .0000 .5447
United States .0072 .0312 .0000 .1538
European Union .0609 .0630 .0000 .2222
Rest ofWorld .0125 .0340 .0000 .1688
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Table 4. Summary Statistics for Competitor Wheat and Wheat
Market Share in Egypt for 1970-1993
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Wheat .6804 .1112 .4917 .9265
United States .2569 .1574 .0000 .6283
European Union .1173 .1222 .0000 .5345
Australia .2255 .1201 .0000 .5562
Rest ofWorld .0805 .0592 .0053 .2150
Wheat Flour .3195 .1112 .0734 .5082
United States .0899 .0682 .0000 .2896
European Union .1251 .0561 .0281 .2371
Rest of World .0113 .0349 .0000 .1732
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Table 5. Summary Statistics for Competitor Wheat and Wheat Flour
Market Share in Jordan for 1970-1993.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Wheat .71]5 .2829 .1896 .9951
United States .4476 .2765 .0091 .9660
Rest ofWorld .2638 .2475 .0012 .8315
Wheat Flour .2885 .2829 .0048 .8103
United States .0907 .1833 .0000 .6050
European Union .1255 .1256 .0010 .3943
Rest of World .0721 .0751 .0004 .2938
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Table 6.
Variable
Summary Statistics for Competitor Wheat Market Share in
South Korea and Japan for 1970-1993
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
South Korea
United States .7967 .2117 .3699 .9835
Canada .0595 .1088 .0000 .3785
Rest ofWorld .1436 .1371 .0118 .4418
Japan
United States .5569 .0348 .4935 .6876
Canada .2720 .0155 .2356 .2910
Australia .] 7]0 .0364 .0300 .2531
•
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Table 7. Wald Test Results for Endogeneity
flu: Expenditure is Exogenous
Algeria:
Wald Statistic .454
P-value .500
Egypt:
Wald Statistic .662
P-value .415
Jordan:
Wald Statistic .266
P-value .605
South Korea
Wald Statistic 2.269
P-value .131
Japan
Wald Statistic .401
P-value .526
•
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Table 8. Marshallian Elasticities of Algerian Wheat and Wheat Flour Demand Using the RSDAIDS Model, Assuming Block
Substitutability
EXD .9810*** .9339*** t 1.123**\ .8828*** ( 1.091 *** .9968*** .9229***
System R2 = .9903
Wheat t. Flour
rn G.~ij? ROW lIS Ell ROWPwus -2.364*** .3406 -1.179
Pwcn .7105 -.5965 1.348 .0667
Pweu ~ -.2825 -1.497** 1.495~Pwrow .4404*~) -.2991 -.3521 -1.609***
Pfus -1.829*** 2.312*** .0832
Phil 5.519*** -1.229*** 3.232***
Plow .5536 -.8877*** -.9853
00
-.0860 -.0965 -.3144** .3438**IN Pflour
PWheal -5.533*** -1.191 *** -3.253***
-
"
Notes: In column one, P = price and Exp = expenditure; w = wheat,f= flour; us = United States, eu = European Union, en =
canada, au = Australia, and row = Rest ofWorld.
***denotes 1% significance; **denotes 5% significance; *denotes 10% significance
Table 8a. Hicksian Elasticities of Algerian Wheat and Wheat Flour Demand Using the RSDAIDS Model, Assuming Block
Substitutability
w."'eat Flour
US .eN Ell ROW US EU ROW
Pwus -1.452*** -.2766 1.848* -1.818
Pwcn -.0211 .3047 -2.040*** -.6916
Pweu -.5115 -1.120*** -.5559 .6490
Pwrow -.4987*** -1.241 *** -1.282 -.6973
~ Pius
Pf.u
P!'ow
Pjlour
Pwheat
-1.006*** -1.021 *** -1.223*** -.5848***
-1.747
4.585***
-.4326
-5.331 ***
1.318*** -.9100
-1.148*** 2.288***
-1.875*** -.9055
-1.191 *** -3.404***
System R2 = .9903
Note: Refer to table 8 footnote.
Table 8b. Parameter Estimates and t-ratios of Algerian Wheat and Wheat Flour Demand Using the RSDAIDS Model,
Assuming Block_S~bstitutability
ROW
Elmu:
illusROW
-.0761
(-.8189)
.0021
(.0302)
,0915
(1.801)
-.0386
(-1.139)
Wheat
Jill
.4238
(2.168)
-.22842
(-1.537)
-,0826
(-.7674)
-.0598
(-.8554)
rn
.0857
(.5665)
.1054
(.9090)
.0804
(-.9738)
-.0829
(-1.515)
US
-.5620
(-2.331)
.2890
(1.568)
.1289
(.9781)
.1799
(2.070)
Pw.u
Pwus
Pwe"
Pwrow
00
IJI
Plus
PJ.u
Pirow
Pf/ollr
Pwheoc
-.0059 .1408 .0010
(-.4539) (5.369) (.0774)
.0399 -.0139 .0405
(4.051) (-.7339) (4057)
.0041 -.0540 .0001
(.3844) (-2.585) (.0162)
-,0358 -.0278 -.05292 .0207
(-1.3154 (-1.654) (-2.286) (1992)
-.0379 -,0172 -.0418
(-10.491) (-8.978) (11.172)
Exp -.0077 -.0180 .0213 -,0072 .0006 -.0001 -.0009
(-.6128) (-2.3§§) (1.864) (:,1.521) _(.4984} (-.06241_ 1:.]024)
System R2 = .9903
Note: Refer to table 8 footnote.; t-ratios are in parenthesis O.
Table 9. Marshallian Elasticities ofEgyptian Wheat and Flour Import Demand Using the RSDAIDS Model, Assuming Block
Substitutability
Wheat Flour
liS. }ill fill ROW US Ell ROW
Pwus -.6403 -.8270 -.0817 .9617
Pweu -.3727 -.0213 1.343** -.0239
Pwau -.0580 2.585** -2.5598*** .8148
Pw,ow .6422 -3.232 .3851 -3.2415**
00 Pius -.9658* .2500 2.099
0\
P.leu .3349 -1.1411*** 1.442
Phow .6321* -.0029 -1.256
PflQU'
P"'heat
-.3323* -.4655 -.1569 .1662
-.7202*** -.3446** -3.297**
Exp .9424*** .9878***
System R2 = .9599
Note: Refer to Table 8 footnote.
1.003*** 1.085*** 1.033*** .9305*** .9673***
Table 9a.
.. --'
Hicksian Elasticities of Egyptian Wheat and Flour Import Demand Using the RSDAlDS Model, Assuming Block
Substitutability
Wheat Flour
us. Ell AU ROW us. Ell RQW
Pw"" .0252 -1573 -.8240 .2405
Pweu -1.262** .6576 .4614 -.8966
Pwau -.8455* 1808* -1.878*** .0595
PwTOW -.2818 -4.152** -.5339 -2.554
Pi"" -.6432 -.6662 1.18600
.....:I
Pl." -.5356 -.8301 *** .5634
P/'ow -.3564 -.9924*** -.9376
PfiouT
Pwheal
-1.0312*** -1.1499 -.8363*** -.4870
-1.016*** -.7114*** -3.639***
System R2 = .9599
Note: Refer to Table 8 footnote.
Table 9b. Parameter Estimates and t-ratios ofEgyptian Wheat and Flour Import Demand Using the RSDAIDS Model,
Assuming Block Substitutability
Wheat Flour
u.s Jill &! ROW u.s. EU ROW
Pw ILS .0885 -.0974 -.0182 .0792
(.4935) (-.7056) (-.1510) (.9251)
Pweu -.0974 .1147 3031 -.0011
(-.7056) (.5347) (2.337) (-.0116)
Pwau -.0182 .3031 -..3516 .0672
(-.1510) (2.337) (-2.565) (.8304)
Pwrow .1638 -.3794 .0869 -.1801
(.8632) (-1.584) (.5612) (-1.369)
gg P!vs .0033 .0305 .0236
(.0699) (.8690) (.7784)
Pf.u .0305 -.0187 .0162
(.8690) (-.4417) (.4537)
Pf,.('W .0568 -.0004 -.0029
(1.656) (-.0163) (-.1115)
Pjlour -.0901 -.0551 -.0351
(-1.794) (-1.053) (-.8126)
P"'h.ar -.0627 -.0490 -.0375
(-2.978) (-2.510) (-2.165)
Erp -.0147 -.0014 .0006 .0030 -.0086 -.0003
(-1.266) (-.1252) (.0729) (.5683) (-2.170) (-.1048)
System R2 = .9599
Note: Refer to Table 8 footnote.; t-ratios are in parenthesis O.
Table 10. Marshallian Elasticities of Jordanian Wheat and Wheat Flour Import Demand Using the RSDAIDS Model, Assuming
Block Substitutability
:us
Wheat •
ROW :us
Wheat Flour
Ell ROW
PwllJ
Pwrow
Pius
~ Pl."
Pirew
Pjlour
PWh~Ql
Exp
-1.674***
.3290
-.1926***
1.438***
-2.032*
1.614
-.3184***
.2153
-3.719***
.0471
-.0339
-.1567
.4638
-.0586
-.0372
.4899
-.9415***
1.486***
2.256***
-.8775
-.0485
-.2911
.6453*
System R2 = .9850
Note: Refer to Table 8 footnote.
Table lOa. Hicksian Elasticities of Jordanian Wheat and Wheat Flour Import Demand Using the RSDAIDS Model, Assuming
Block Substitutability
Pwus
Pwraw
Wh~at
us.
-.7672
-.2915
•
ROW
.7104
-1.528
llS.
Wheat Flour
ED RQW
Pjus -3.479*** -.9238 1.314
~ Pl." -.8945 -.0227 -1.796***
P/"aw ~1.000 -.4028 .2143
Pjlour
PWMQ1
-.7778*** -1.256***
-.8267*** -.8842*** -.8319***
System R2 = .9850
Note: Refer to Table 8 footnote.
Table lOb. Parameter Estimates and t-ratios of Jordanian Wheat and Wheat Flour Import Demand Using the RSDAIDS Model,
Assuming Block Substitutability
Wheat Wheat Flour
PwILt
Pwrow
P!1Lt
Pf.u
10 Plrow
Pf/OUT
PWh~al
Exp
System R2 = .9850
liS ~ us. EU RQW
-.2142 .3331
(-7726) (1.172)
.1990 -.3271
(.6589) (-1.059)
-.2511 -.0018 .1605
(-1.897) (-.0199) (2667)
-0018 .0864 -.0665
(-.0199) (1.125) (-1.365)
-0065 .0659 .0668
(-.0999) (1.184) (1.683)
-.0296 -.1437
(-.7489) (-3.667)
-.0488 -.0748 -.0392
(-2.371) (-4.903) (-4.221)
.1960 -.2070 -.0486 .0610 -.0255
(I.I853) (-1.906) ~-.7652) (1.303) (-.9042)
Note: Refer to Table 8 footnote.
t-ratios are in parenthesis O.
Table 11. Marshallian Elasticities of South Korean Wheat Import Demand
Using the Restricted SDAIDS Model
PwlU
Pwcn
Pwr(M
-.7418*** -.6546
.1250* -1.847*
.0882 -.9459
~
-.0251
-1.007
-1.272·"
Exp .5285*** 3.447*** 2.304*"
SystemR2=.6932
Note: Refer to Table 8 footnote.
Table 11 a. Hicksian Elasticities of South Korean Wheat Import Demand
Using the Restricted SDAIDS Model
Pwcn
-1.117*** 1.092
-.8434*** -1.701 *
RQW
.8109
-1.870***
Pwrow -.8354*** -1.450*
System R2 =.6932
Note: Refer to Table 8 footnote.
-1.084***
92
lIb. Parameter Estimates and t-ratios of South Korean Wheat
Import Demand Using the Restricted SDAIDS Model
liS Qi ROW
Pwws -.0935 .0772 .1456
(-.8773) (1.299) (1.523)
Pwen .0772 -.0417 -.1335
(1.299) (-.6684) (-1.337)
Pwrow .0163 -.0354 -.0121
(.1892) (-.7127) (-.2269)
EX[) -.3756 .1458 .1873
(-5.443) (3.822) (2.923)
System R 2=.6834
Note: Refer to Table 8 footnote.
Table 12. Marshallian Elasticities of Japanese Wheat Import Demand
Using the Restricted SDAIDS Model
us. .cAN AllS.
Pwws -1.468** -.4666* .4533
Pwen -.3188** -.4881* -.0299
Pwau .9612*** .3788 -2.346***
Exp .9096***
System R 2=.6799
Note: Refer to Table 8 footnote.
.5755***
93
1.643**
Table 12a. Hicksian Elasticities of Japan.ese Wheat Import Demand
Using the Restricted SDAIDS Model
Pwus
Pwen
-1.518***
-1.071 ***
-1. 146"'* *
-.6035***
.3684
-.5830
Pway .1168
System R 2=.6799
Note: Refer to Table 8 footnote.
-.5227"'* -2.234***
Table 12b. Parameter Estimates and t-ratios of Japanese Wheat Import
Demand Using the Restricted SDAIDS Model
us CAN AllS.
Pwus -.2889 -.1912 -.1388
(-2.082) (-2.668) (1.183)
Pwen -.1912 .1078 .0247
(-2.668) (1.593) (.1822)
Pway .5267 .0833 -.2114
(4.395) (1.303) (-2.067)
Exp -.0503 -.1154 .1099
(-.4269) (-1. 734 (.8288)
System R2=.6799
Note: Refer to Table 8 footnote.
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•APPENDIX:
MISSPECIFICAnON TESTING RESULTS
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Table A. Government Assisted Importers' Wheat and Wheat Flour Demand Models:
The p-values for Full-System Misspecification Tests
AJgeria Egypt Jordan
Individual Tests
Functional Form .0064
Parameter Stability .0394
Heteroskedasticity
Static .0000
Dynamic .0000
Autocorrelation .0000
Joint Tests
Overall Mean Test .0009
Parameter Stability .03 55
Functional Form .0906
AutoCorrelation .3938
Overall Variance Test .000 1
Parameter Stability .6675
Static Hetero. .0000
Dynamic Hetero. .1111
•
96
.0015 .0390
.1864 .6564
.0012 .0003
.0155 .6301
.0000 .0120
.0000 .0002
.3062 .2591
.0354 .0046
.0000 .0020
.0000 .0227
.2632 .9441
.0000 .0276
.1959 .7032
Table B. Non-Government Assisted Importers' Wheat Demand Models:
The p-values fOf Full-System Misspecification Tests
South Korea Japan
Individual Tests
Functional Form
Parameter Stability
Heteroskedasticity:
Static
Dynamic
Autocorrelation
Joint Tests
Overall Mean Test
Parameter Stability
Functional Form
AutoCorrelation
Overall Variance Test
Parameter Stability
Static Hetero.
Dynamic Hetero.
•
.2055 .9757
.8797 .5225
.0163 .3976
.5853 .0600
.7299 .0109
.5932 .0761
.5600 .4621
.1571 .7881
.8975 .0086
.1056 .0000
.9513 .0000
.0355 .0092
.3748 .6825
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Table C. Algeria Wheat and Wheat Flour Demand Model: The p-values for Equation by Equation System Misspecification Tests
WHEAT FLOUR
United States Canada EU RofW US EU ROW
Individual Tests
Functional Form .0677 .7100 .2008 .0186 .6232 .4727 .8408
Parameter Stability:
Variance .6876 .8865 .6730 .8887 .8893 .4503 .9001
Mean .1016 .5986 .3607 .4452 .8833 .2549 .9427
Heteroskedasticity:
Static
US wheat .8808 .3798 .5364 .9299 .8623 .1697 .0998
Can wheat .9174 .6875 .2182 .1007 .7067 .1691
1.0 EUwheat .6156 .7254 .0256 .0472 .143000
ROW wheat .9219 .9270 .0948 .3086
US flour .6232 .7147 .2404
EU flour .3118 .8468
ROW flour .7160
Dynamic
US wheat .2847 .0969 .6567 .4773 .4507 .5422 .3527
Can wheat .0823 .0372 .0121 .2974 .1590 .3843
EUwheat .7620 .1771 .3789 .2598 .6936
ROW wheat .6945 .2541 .7533 .3174
US flour .4802 .7072 .5077
EU flour .2828 .6130
ROW flour .5032
Autocorrelation .5228 .0129 .9161 .2676 .8569 .2752 .9805
Table C. Algeria Wheat and Wheat Flour Demand Model: The p-values for Equation by Equation System Misspecification Tests
(continued)
WHEAT FLOUR
US Canada EU ROW US ED ROW
.
Joint Tests
Overall Mean Test .4214 .4420 .5053 .1684 .2088 .5428 .7924
Parameter Stability .2483 .0636 .1663 .7629 .5631 .7202 .3345
Functional Form .7644 .6414 .7423 .2940 .1113 .5516 .6435
AutoCorrelation .2201 .3539 .4768 .2602 .7601 .8199 .9746
Overall Variance Test .2347 .0519 .7954 .7733 .1105 .0720 .3701
Parameter Stability .5107 .9240 .9539 .6922 .9964 .3848 .4816
\0 Static Hetero. .1382 .0266 .6652 .6967 .0808 .0429 .3119
\0 Dynamic Hetero. .1954 .1178 .5895 .6241 .7093 .5627 .6229
Table D. Egypt Wheat and Wheat Flour Demand Model: The p-values for Equation by Equation System Misspecification Tests
WHEAT FLOUR
US EU AU ROW US EU ROW
Individual Tests
•
Functional Form .6021 .0842 . .0513 .3160 .4401 8019 .4204
Parameter Stability:
Variance .8175 .4282 .6187 .2054 .0378 .0642 .0600
Mean .4411 .3531 .9675 .0856 .4450 .6267 .3167
Heteroskedasticity:
Static
US wheat .7909 .8407 .3957 .7093 .8542 .0281 .8352
EU wheat .0007 .2139 .1822 .5685 .0902 .3516
-0 AU wheat .0032 .5451 .8281 .2146 .43360
ROW wheat .0434 .5249 .2547 .9138
US flour .0586 .0017 7600
EU flour .8848 .7755
ROW flour .7202
Dynamic
US wheat .9078 .0317 .8576 .0622 .7812 .3635 .9041
EU wheat .9884 .0259 .7853 .8146 .9124 .0995
AU wheat .1078 .0070 .7917 .4300 .2418
ROW wheat .0789 .3587 .6034 .9703
US flour .1339 .0143 .2210
EU flour .4480 .9728
ROW flour .2144
Autocorrelation .0039 .1395 .6797 .2796 .4543 .9005 .1128
TableD Egypt Wheat and Wheat Flour Demand Model: The p-values for Equation by Equation System Misspecification Tests
(continued)
WHEAT FLQUR
US EU AU ROW US EU ROW
.
Joint Tests
Overall Mean Test .3366 .0727 .9293 .8879 .0182 .8084 .6897
Parameter Stability .7705 .1445 ,3049 .6021 .0079 .5632 .2968
Functional Form .4336 .1024 ,8283 .9834 .0113 .7422 .5032
Autocorrelation .0769 .0022 ,9745 .5035 .8020 .3242 .9795
Overall Variance Test .0383 .0000 .0018 .1479 .3552 .3593 .2057
Parameter Stability .2022 .9317 .3731 .2204 .7964 .6751 .0657
o Static Heteroscedasticity .0353 .0000 .0025 .1864 .5189 .4037 .2194
- Dynamic Heteroscedasticity .9560 .7311 .6486 .0892 .1220 .1126 .2332
-j
Table E. Jordan Wheat and Wheat Flour Demand Model: The p-values for Equation by Equation System Misspecification Tests
WEAT FLOUR
US ROW US EU ROW
,
Individual Tests .
Functional Fonn .9650 .9447 .0071 .7939 .0810
Parameter Stability
Variance .0547 .0547 .8476 .8546 .9921
Mean .7057 .9389 .6297 .9431 .9290
Heteroscedasticity:
Static
US wheat .0079 .0079 .4914 .4007 .2162
.- ROW wheat .0079 .1650 .0038 .21620
N US flour .4571 .3325 .9433
EU flour .5604 .3577
ROW flour .0316
Dynamic
US wheat .9967 .9967 .0265 .8066 .0340
ROW wheat .9967 .3130 .3035 .0340
US flour .9837 .1149 .7884
EU flour .6524 .4061
ROW flour .4121
Autocorrelation .2615 .1339 .0247 .0130 .4576
Table E. Jordan Wheat and Wheat Flour Demand Model: The p-values for Equation by Equation System Misspecification Tests
(continued)
Joint Tests
WHEAT
US ROW US
FLOUR
EU ROW
Overall Mean Test
Parameter Stability
Functional Form
Autocorrelation
Overall Variance Test
Parameter Stability
o Static Heteroscedasticity
W Dynamic Heteroscedasticity
.7790
.4276
.8636
.2689
.2051
.8513
.1280
.7390
.6856
.5786
.7409
.1168
.7209
.3884
.5844
.9476
.0065 .0070 .1093
.6927 .7323 .2338
.0226 .0414 .0403
.0216 .0105 .2451
.5112 .2500 .0268
.4233 .5923 .0444
.3191 .1531 .0112
.7233 .5289 1158
Table F. South Korea Wheat Demand Model: The p-values for Equation by Equation
System Misspecification Tests
US CAN ROW
Individual Tests
Functional Form .9997 .2641 .8119
Parameter Stability:
Variance .3809 .4575 .2973
Mean .8460 .8059 .7838
Heteroscedasticity:
Static
US wheat .2624 .1651 .1006
CAN wheat .0366 .3556
ROW wheat .1921
Dynamic
US wheat .7501 .0783 .2298
CAN wheat .5544 .3064
ROW wheat .4652
Autocorrelation .8654 .9664 .3829
Joint Tests
Overall Mean Test .9988 .2653 .8562
Parameter Stability .8013 .7732 .8674
Functional Form .9880 .0880 .8926
Autocorrelation .8458 .8887 .3933
Overall Variance Test .6870 .3078 .2226
Parameter Stability .9356 .8370 .6557
Static Heteroscedasticity .5203 .1759 .1712
Dynamic Heteroscedasticity .4325 .4579 .0933
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"Table G. Japan Wheat Demand Model: The p-values for Equation by Equation
System Misspecification Tests
US CAN AUS
Individual Tests
Functional Fonn .8767 .9977 .4219
Parameter Stability:
Variance .7342 .0020 .0447
Mean .7379 .3504 .6449
Heteroscedasticity:
Static
US wheat .3765 .2712 .0062
CAN wheat .5477 .1953
AUS wheat .8187
Dynamic
US wheat .9155 .1583 .5449
CAN wheat .0472 .6594
AUS wheat .3979
Autocorrelation .5938 .0142 .6264
Joint Tests
Overall Mean Test .9751 .1606 .1705
Parameter Stability .7844 .3318 .5513
Functional Form .9257 .8728 .0605
Autocorrelation .5902 .0230 .1970
Overall Variance Test .5035 .0027 .0000
Parameter Stability .2923 .0008 .0018
Static Heteroscedasticity .2251 .0309 .0000
Dynamic Heteroscedasticity .4396 .3159 .0650
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